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Abstract
The extensive pressures upon current commercial fisheries, compounded by the pro-
jected impacts of climate change and associated processes on marine ecosystems, will 
increasingly displace elements of future fishing effort towards new locations, target 
species and techniques. For transboundary stocks, where a new or exploratory fishery 
is contemplated, Article 6(6) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 1995 mandates cautious 
conservation measures to acquire sufficient catch data to assess the impacts of fishing 
on the stock and surrounding ecosystem. Thereafter, if appropriate, measures may be 
adopted to facilitate the gradual development of the fishery and its eventual transition 
to commercial management. However, there has been minimal analysis of the regula-
tory requirements for emergent fisheries during this interim stage. This article accord-
ingly collates and evaluates the current international law and practice towards new 
and exploratory fisheries, with particular reference to Antarctic developments and the 
protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems from proliferating deep-sea fisheries.
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 Introduction
It is increasingly evident that significant adjustments to existing marine cap-
ture fisheries will be necessary in order to meet the future demand for sea-
food from an ever-expanding global population. Concerns have long been 
raised that many commercial fisheries have consistently operated at or beyond 
their maximum sustainable yield, imperilling their long-term ecological and 
economic sustainability. Indeed, the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) considers that, even accounting for regional variations 
and fluctuations, over thirty percent of global fish stocks are at present over-
fished, and approximately sixty percent are deemed to be fully fished.1 With 
states having generally proven unwilling to countenance sweeping reductions 
to allocations, there is accordingly a pressing need to consider other options, 
including the extension of current effort into different locations and depths, 
deploying novel or adapted fishing techniques and gear, and targeting new or 
previously under-fished species.
In parallel to these considerations, climate change and associated processes 
are also poised to play a key role in the (re-)distribution of fish stocks in the 
coming decades and, by extension, the location and composition of future cap-
ture fisheries. Rising sea temperatures and ocean acidification will continue to 
exert a strong influence over the future distribution patterns of fish and inter-
dependent species, with many commercially valuable stocks now ‘undergoing 
phenological and geographical shifts as a result of warming’.2 Current projec-
tions indicate a general trend towards the eventual displacement of numerous 
1   FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016: Contributing to Food Security and 
Nutrition for All (FAO, Rome, 2016) at p. 38.
2   J-P Gattuso, A Magnan, R. Billé, WWL Cheung, EL Howes, F Joos, D Allemand, L Bopp, 
SR Cooley, CM Eakin, O Hoegh-Guldberg, RP Kelly, H-O Pörtner, AD Rogers, JM Baxter, 
D Laffoley, D Osborn, A Rankovic, J Rochette, UR Sumaila, S Treyer and C Turley, ‘Contrasting 
Futures for Ocean and Society from Different Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Scenarios’ (2015) 
349 Science 4722–4732, at p. 4732.
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fish species to deeper ocean waters and the Polar Regions,3 with a correspond-
ing reduction in catch potential in the Tropics.4 Indeed, warm-water species 
have increasingly dominated global catches in recent years,5 which has been 
primarily attributed to a tangible shift in ocean temperatures.6 Similar pat-
terns of adjustment are also becoming apparent on a regional basis. In Europe, 
for instance, warming seas have seemingly provoked distributional shifts in 
a number of pelagic fish species endemic to the region,7 while irregular tem-
perature ‘spikes’ have created conditions conducive to the greater availability 
of particular stocks in individual fishing seasons.8 The dispersal of stocks to 
new depths and locations accordingly presents inviting commercial possibili-
ties for particular coastal states, albeit at the likely expense of others. Indeed, 
recent evidence suggests that warm-water species have now become present 
in British and Irish waters in sufficient quantities to generate new and lucra-
tive fishing opportunities for species such as sea bass, red mullet, John Dory, 
anchovy and squid.9 Future prospects for new commercial fisheries have also 
been tentatively raised in the High North, as warming seas are predicted to 
gradually facilitate the removal of natural climatic barriers to the colonisation 
of Arctic waters by a number of species across the coming decades.10
3    AL Perry, PJ Low, JR Ellis and JD Reynolds, ‘Climate Change and Distribution Shifts in 
Marine Fishes’ (2005) 308 Science 1912–1915, at pp. 1913–1914.
4    WWL Cheung, VWY Lam, JL Sarmiento, K Kearney, R Watson, D Zeller and D Pauly, 
‘Large-Scale Redistribution of Maximum Fisheries Catch Potential in the Global Ocean 
under Climate Change’ (2010) 16(1) Global Change Biology 24–35, at pp. 30–31.
5    UR Sumaila, WWL Cheung, VWY Lam, D Pauly and S Herrick, ‘Climate Change Impacts 
on the Biophysics and Economics of World Fisheries’ (2011) 1 Nature Climate Change 449–
456, at p. 451.
6    WWL Cheung, R Watson and D Pauly, ‘Signature of Ocean Warming in Global Fisheries 
Catch’ (2013) 497 Nature 365–368, at pp. 365–66.
7    I Montero-Serra, M Edwards and MJ Genner, ‘Warming Shelf Seas Drive the 
Subtropicalization of European Pelagic Fish Communities’ (2015) 21(1) Global Change 
Biology 144–153, at pp. 149–150.
8    P Petitgas, J Alheit, MA Peck, K Raab, X Irigoien, M Huret, J Van Der Kooij, T Pohlmann, 
C Wagner, I Zarraonaindia and M Dickey-Collas, ‘Anchovy Population Expansion in the 
North Sea’ (2012) 444 Marine Ecology Progress Series 1–13, at p. 10.
9    See WWL Cheung, J Pinnegar, G Merino, MC Jones and M Barange, ‘Review of Climate 
Change Impacts on Marine Fisheries in the UK and Ireland’ (2012) 22(3) Aquatic 
Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 368–388, at p. 374.
10   See further MS Wisz, O Broennimann, P Grønkjær, PR Møller, SM Olsen, D Swingedouw, 
RB Hedeholm, EE Neilsen, A Guisan and L Pellissier, ‘Arctic Warming Will Promote 
Atlantic-Pacific Fish Interchange’ (2015) 5 Nature Climate Change 261–265, at p. 262 and 
JS Christiansen, CW Mecklenburg and OV Karamushko, ‘Arctic Marine Fishes and their 
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The pursuit of prospective fishing opportunities nevertheless presents con-
siderable attendant management challenges. Emerging fisheries are acutely 
susceptible to the risks of over-exploitation, where the combination of an 
effective regulatory vacuum and the prospect of high short-term profits has 
served to facilitate a bleakly familiar cycle of ‘boom-and-bust’. Moreover, new 
fisheries are often pursued in locations for which there is limited scientific 
knowledge of the stock and its surrounding ecosystem; hence there is signifi-
cant uncertainty as to the impacts of fishing upon both the target species and 
the wider marine environment. The regulation of new and exploratory fisher-
ies accordingly represents an intriguing and challenging context by which to 
consider the practical application of the precautionary approach to interna-
tional fisheries management.
Despite these increasingly pressing concerns, the legal requirements incum-
bent in the initiation of new fishing opportunities have thus far received sur-
prisingly little analysis. As outlined below, where ‘new or exploratory fisheries’ 
are under contemplation, Article 6(6) of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
(UNFSA)11 prescribes a broad obligation to adopt cautious conservation and 
management measures at a preliminary stage, which are to remain in effect 
until sufficient data are available to permit a clear assessment of the impact 
of fishing upon the long-term sustainability of the target stock and the wider 
ecosystem. Thereafter, if feasible and appropriate, further conservation and 
management measures may be implemented, with a view towards the gradual 
development of the fishery.
Although these requirements have been framed in the specific context of 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, similar policies and commitments 
have been adopted by a growing number of regulatory bodies in recent years. 
While little explored, such provisions collectively represent a key element of 
the precautionary approach to fisheries management and envisage markedly 
stronger controls over new and exploratory activities than are applied to exist-
ing capture fisheries, given the general lack of baseline data concerning the 
Fisheries in the Light of Global Change’ (2014) 20(2) Global Change Biology 352–359, at 
pp. 354–356. The extent of this potential windfall is nevertheless highly uncertain, as 
projections conversely indicate that ocean acidification and fresh-water inflow into this 
region may ultimately inhibit particular fisheries: see VWY Lam, WWL Cheung and 
UR Sumaila, ‘Marine Capture Fisheries in the Arctic: Winners or Losers under Climate 
Change and Ocean Acidification?’ (2016) 17(2) Fish and Fisheries 335–357, at pp. 348–349.
11   Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (New York, 4 August 1995, in 
force 11 December 2001) 2167 UNTS 88.
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sensitivity of the target stock and its associated ecosystem to the impacts of 
future fishing.
A degree of mystery surrounds the scope and application of these require-
ments, however. Interpretive questions arise as to the definitional parameters 
of both ‘new’ and ‘exploratory’ fisheries and the precautionary management 
regime required throughout these preliminary stages of a nascent fishery. 
The threshold requirements incumbent in the transition of new and explor-
atory fisheries to full management are also obscure and, to date, the practice 
of states and regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) in imple-
menting these commitments has been subject to minimal investigation. This 
article accordingly evaluates the range of legal obligations engaged by the pur-
suit of new and exploratory fisheries and collates the developing international 
practice concerning the regulation of such activities.
To this end, this article first considers the regulatory challenges raised by 
new and exploratory fisheries and provides an overview of the current inter-
national legal framework addressing such activities. Thereafter, as this article 
outlines, the regulation of new and exploratory fisheries can be seen to have 
emerged in two distinct contexts. In the first instance, the need to address 
the supervisory lacunae raised by the unregulated development of new fish-
ing activities was first recognised by the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). The nascent policies elaborated 
under these auspices influenced the concurrent negotiation of the UNFSA, re-
sulting in the incorporation of specific requirements for new and exploratory 
fisheries within the general framework for the precautionary approach to fish-
eries management. In turn, the UNFSA has directly influenced the mandates 
of subsequent RFMOs so as to facilitate the regulation of new and exploratory 
fisheries as a standard feature of the practice of the more recently inaugurat-
ed fisheries bodies. A degree of ‘retro-fitting’ of similar requirements has also 
been considered within pre-existing institutions, as new and exploratory fish-
eries have steadily emerged in other regions. This analysis of the law and prac-
tice pertaining to new and exploratory fisheries will demonstrate that a clear 
framework has been established for the further interpretation of Article 6(6) of 
the UNFSA to manage such activities in a precautionary and environmentally 
sensitive manner, although practical difficulties have been encountered in se-
curing sufficient data and in facilitating an appropriate transition point to full 
commercial management.
The second – and more recently evident – factor underpinning the over-
sight of new and exploratory fisheries has been an increased international 
focus upon ensuring responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem, as mandat-
ed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in a series of influential Resolutions 
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adopted since 2004. Particular concerns have been raised by the UNGA over 
the impacts of under-regulated deep-sea bottom-fishing upon the benthic en-
vironment, with RFMOs having been primarily charged with implementing 
standards to protect vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) from the adverse 
consequences of an emerging trend towards fishing in deeper waters. In this 
respect, exploratory bottom fishing has been subject to an increased volume of 
regulation by RFMOs in this specific context, based on these political impera-
tives and drawing upon the technical advice of the FAO. This has generated 
a strong degree of uniformity in these requirements within a relatively short 
time-frame, which may be accordingly considered to represent the minimum 
standards for exploratory fishing activities in the deep-sea environment and a 
key component of the current global regime for the protection of VMEs.
 The Objective and Conduct of New and Exploratory Fisheries
The requirements of new and exploratory fishing activities have generally oc-
cupied a peripheral position within the otherwise extensive legal framework 
for the regulation of fisheries. There is as yet no universal definition of either 
a ‘new’ or an ‘exploratory’ fishery in current international law: indeed, these 
terms were left undefined in the UNFSA while, as discussed below, individual 
RFMOs have adopted subtly different approaches to address the particular 
conditions and circumstances through which new and exploratory fisheries 
are conducted under their regulatory purviews. Likewise, in some circum-
stances these specific activities have become steadily blurred with other types 
of non-commercial fishing, rendering the distinction between exploratory and 
research fisheries increasingly fluid. Accordingly, the policies towards new and 
exploratory fisheries by various actors and institutions have largely developed 
in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion.
The nature of fishing activities in particular regions also means that the over-
sight of new and exploratory fisheries as a general concern is far from an equal 
regulatory priority for all RFMOs, further compounding a sense of managerial 
fragmentation. There are isolated examples of extensive practice towards new 
and exploratory fisheries in particular regions, notably the Southern Ocean. 
For many other actors, such policies remain at a preliminary stage, as the regu-
lation of these activities has become a more recent concern, prompted largely 
by global initiatives towards the concerted protection of VMEs, as discussed 
further below. Meanwhile, other RFMOs have not substantively considered 
this issue at all. These regulatory conditions have thereby militated somewhat 
against the emergence of a clear and consistent definition of, and cross-cutting 
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rules for, the further oversight of new and exploratory fisheries on a global basis. 
Nevertheless, as this article reveals, regional innovations – notably within 
Antarctic fisheries – can be seen to have pioneered a series of guiding prin-
ciples by which to regulate new and exploratory fisheries. The coalescence of 
these policies, initially developed to bring procedural order to specific emerg-
ing fishing opportunities, has in the absence of clearer global rules, generated 
regional practices that retain a strong emphasis on precautionary manage-
ment, prior approval, extensive data collection and ongoing scientific review.
New and exploratory fishing activities are primarily exemplified in three 
broad contexts. In the first instance, fisheries may be tentatively introduced in 
respect of species that have not previously been fished on a commercial basis. 
Second, new fishing areas may be piloted under the auspices of extant regula-
tory structures for species that may already be subject to exploitation. Third, 
new methods may be developed to catch species within an existing fishery, 
such as the use of new techniques or equipment, or by adjusting catch effort 
at a point higher or lower in the water column. Each of these scenarios will 
inevitably involve a strong degree of uncertainty over the prospective impacts 
of even a limited degree of fishing activity. The regulatory challenge incum-
bent in new and exploratory fisheries is therefore to ensure that these activities 
shall not compromise the stock in question, or its associated ecosystem, before 
meaningful and prudent regulation can be applied to it. Indeed, such a fate has 
befallen previously unfished stocks with alarming regularity, and considerable 
anxiety has already been voiced over the environmental vulnerability of pro-
spective fisheries generated by changing ocean dynamics.12
New and exploratory fisheries remain fundamentally distinct to established 
fisheries. They are primarily characterised by a lack of scientific data concern-
ing stock levels and the surrounding ecosystem, which militates against the 
application of commercial catch limits. Such fishing is instead subject to a 
(pre-)cautious approach to regulation, advancing considerably more stringent 
controls on access and effort than are generally imposed under more estab-
lished management conditions, which may be gradually relaxed as additional 
data are subsequently generated. The effective regulation of new and explor-
atory fisheries therefore places considerable importance upon the collection 
of particular data, because such activities are often pursued in locations for 
which there is little scope to acquire fisheries-independent information on the 
target stock and its accompanying environment. The endorsement of a pilot 
fishing programme accordingly represents a calculated regulatory gamble that 
a restricted degree of supervised fishing will yield sufficient data to allow for 
12   Wisz et al. (n 10) at p. 263.
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increasingly accurate projections of the commercial feasibility of that fishery, 
as well as its prospective impact upon the wider marine ecosystem, while in-
flicting minimal environmental damage in the process. Indeed, the regulatory 
conundrum posed by new and exploratory fisheries was succinctly articulated 
by the FAO at the negotiating sessions for the UNFSA:
It is usually impossible to forecast, with any degree of accuracy, the im-
pact that a new fishery will have before it starts and some data are col-
lected. It might therefore be imagined that no fishery could be developed 
because evidence of the absence of adverse impact cannot be given by 
those involved in the venture. A precautionary approach, in such a case, 
should lead to agreement for a pilot fishery large enough to collect data 
and build up the scientific evidence required, but small enough to en-
sure that no irreversible effect is likely. In practice, there will usually be 
a trade-off: a small amount of risk for the resources being exploited will 
have to be accepted in exchange for the possibility to provide food and a 
livelihood for humans.13
It is difficult to accurately quantify the scale of new and exploratory fisheries 
on a global basis. By its very nature, such fishing is highly variable and the ex-
ploitation of intended pilot fisheries may in practice be influenced as much by 
commercial, meteorological and environmental factors as by regulatory con-
siderations in any given fishing season. At present, new and exploratory fisher-
ies are most prevalent in the Southern Ocean, where such endeavours have 
been regulated under the umbrella of CCAMLR for over twenty-five years. New 
and exploratory fisheries have consistently expanded in these waters since 
2000, with similar arrangements tentatively developing within other regions 
in recent years. An increasing degree of exploratory deep-sea fishing has also 
been conducted in other locations, particularly the North Atlantic, for which a 
distinct regulatory regime has begun to emerge, guided primarily by the politi-
cal spur provided by adherence to pertinent UNGA Resolutions.
Despite the logistical, practical and financial challenges incumbent in such 
activities, the development of new and exploratory fisheries has steadily be-
come an issue of increasing regulatory significance for a number of RFMOs. 
13   FAO, The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries with Reference to Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; Document A/CONF.164/INF/8, 26 January 2994, para 90; 
reproduced in J-P Lévy and GG Schram (eds), United Nations Conference on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Selected Documents (Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1996) at p. 574.
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Indeed, new and exploratory fisheries may represent the only potential fishing 
opportunities available in principle to purported new entrants to particular 
regional bodies, as has for instance been clearly stated in the context of the 
North Atlantic region.14 It is therefore likely that new and exploratory fish-
eries will continue to expand in the future as existing constituents strive to 
maximise yields from these allocations, while new participants seek to secure 
access to stocks in a climate of increasing protectionism within current regula-
tory structures.15
 The Global Regulation of New and Exploratory Fisheries
The first formal recognition of the need to regulate new and exploratory fish-
eries on a multilateral basis can be traced back to 1989, under the auspices of 
CCAMLR.16 These emerging policies within CCAMLR exerted a clear influence 
over the elaboration of a specific provision addressing new and exploratory 
fisheries within the UNFSA, which was negotiated at a broadly similar time. 
14   Indeed, both the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) have advised prospective new participants that, 
‘presently and for the foreseeable future’, their respective stocks have been ‘fully allocated’ 
with fishing opportunities for new members therefore likely to be restricted to new fisher-
ies: see NAFO Resolution 1/99 of 17 September 1999 to Guide the Expectations of Future 
New Members with Regard to Fishing Opportunities in the NAFO Regulatory Area and 
the parallel Guidelines for the Expectation of Future New Contracting Parties with Regard 
to Fishing Opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory Area, adopted at the Twenty-Second 
Annual Meeting of NEAFC in 2003.
15   Whereas Article 8(3) of the UNFSA provides that any state demonstrating a ‘real inter-
est’ in a particular fishery is eligible for membership of any subsequent RFMO regulating 
these stocks, fishing opportunities for new entrants to a number of bodies have proved to 
be rather more ephemeral in reality: A Serdy, ‘Postmodern International Fisheries Law, Or 
We Are All Coastal States Now’ (2011) 60(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
387–422, at pp. 398–418. In practice, however, this trend appears likely to continue in 
respect of new and exploratory fisheries within particular RFMOs; notwithstanding the 
references to new fisheries, NEAFC and NAFO have consistently exercised exclusion-
ary practices towards purported new entrants: A Serdy, The New Entrants Problem in 
International Fisheries Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016) at pp. 96–100. 
Tellingly, the NEAFC position on exploratory bottom fisheries remains contingent upon 
the prior approval of its Members: Recommendation 9:2015, Consolidated Text of all 
NEAFC Recommendations on Regulating Bottom Fishing, available online at www.neafc 
.org, Article 7(4); see further n 195 et seq.
16   Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-VIII), para. 123.
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Moreover, the UNFSA has in turn inspired a varying degree of recognition of 
new and exploratory fisheries within the constituent treaties of subsequent 
RFMOs. Beyond the UNFSA, however, there are few references to new and ex-
ploratory fisheries at the global level, although these activities have received 
further attention during the past decade within the UNGA, which has sought 
to mitigate the impacts of deep-sea fishing – including exploratory activities – 
upon VMEs.
The regulation of new fishing opportunities was not expressly addressed at 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) ne-
gotiations, from which the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC)17 
and its general framework for fisheries competences would ultimately emerge. 
Under the LOSC, states enjoy extensive rights to utilise fisheries resources 
on the high seas18 and in their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs),19 
subject to broad obligations concerning the conservation of the stocks in 
question.20 Although the LOSC is silent on new and exploratory fisheries 
per se, it is nonetheless implicit in these arrangements that fishing, whether in-
dustrial or research-oriented, should not be conducted in a manner that com-
promises the rights of other states or the health of the target stock and its wider 
ecosystem. To this end, Article 61 requires coastal states to take into account 
the interdependence of stocks and prospective impacts upon associated or 
dependent species in framing arrangements for fishing in the EEZ. Moreover, 
the significant data-collection obligations incumbent in new and exploratory 
fisheries complement the requirements of Article 61(2) for a coastal state to 
take into account ‘the best scientific evidence available to it’ to ensure that 
marine living resources are not endangered by over-exploitation. Parallel ar-
rangements for the high seas are more circumspect, with states under the more 
nebulous obligation to exercise ‘due regard’ towards the interests of others.21
These provisions are neither expressly nor implicitly restricted to pre- 
existing fishing activities, however. They have been drafted in an inclusive 
manner, with the intention of promoting informed decision-making founded 
upon access to all pertinent data; hence there would appear to be little practi-
cal merit in a narrow interpretation that would exempt new and exploratory 
fisheries from these requirements. Indeed, the governance regime envisaged by 
17   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994) 1883 UNTS 396.
18   Articles 87(1)(a) and 116.
19   Article 62.
20   Articles 61 (EEZ) and 117–119 (high seas).
21   Article 87(2).
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the LOSC is expressly founded upon securing the maximum sustainable yield 
of fish resources, for which the pursuit of new and exploratory fisheries legiti-
mately represents an important stage in meeting this objective. Accordingly, 
it is tenable to assert that the impacts of pilot fishing activities ought to be 
considered within the broad ambit of these requirements.
Thus far, however, there has been little consideration of the application of 
these provisions in the specific context of future fishing opportunities. The 
unilateral initiation of experimental fishing activities was challenged in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,22 in which high seas entitlements were invoked to 
curtail catches that were potentially unsustainable and allegedly represented 
a circumvention of national catch restrictions.23 Although not an exact tem-
plate of the usual pursuit of new and exploratory fishing opportunities, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) indicated that obliga-
tions to act ‘with prudence and caution’ and to cooperate effectively with other 
participants in the fishery constitute key considerations for the pursuit of ex-
perimental fishing programmes.24 This position also appears implicit within 
the LOSC, which prescribes further obligations to exchange data on catch and 
fishing effort in respect of both the EEZ25 and the high seas.26 Ultimately, as the 
RFMO practices outlined below attest, data-sharing and prior notification have 
become the general hallmarks of current regulatory mechanisms concerned 
with new and exploratory fisheries, and are thus broadly reflective of the spirit 
of the LOSC regime.
The general framework for fisheries governance advanced under the LOSC 
has been further developed through the UNFSA, which has expressly adopted 
a regulatory position on new and exploratory fisheries. To this end, Article 6(6) 
provides:
For new and exploratory fisheries, States shall adopt as soon as possible 
cautious conservation and management measures, including, inter alia, 
catch limits and effort limits. Such measures shall remain in force until 
there are sufficient data to allow assessment of the impact of the fisheries 
22   Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, 
Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999.
23   Ibid., para 90(d).
24   Ibid., paras 77–78. The resulting Arbitral Tribunal subsequently ruled that it did not in 
fact have competence over the dispute and discharged the order for provisional measures 
previously made by ITLOS.
25   Article 61(5).
26   Article 119(2).
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on the long-term sustainability of the stocks, whereupon conservation 
and management measures based on that assessment shall be imple-
mented. The latter measures shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual 
development of the fisheries.
Article 6(6) is therefore of clear significance in consolidating regulatory re-
sponses to the particular challenges posed by new and exploratory fisher-
ies. Indeed, it represents the first formal recognition of new and exploratory 
fisheries within an instrument of global application,27 thereby elevating this 
issue beyond a matter of specific regional concern. Moreover, as intended, the 
UNFSA has exerted considerable influence over the drafting of the constituent 
treaties of subsequent RFMOs, a number of which (as outlined below) have ac-
cordingly enshrined the oversight of new and exploratory fisheries within their 
regulatory purviews, a development that might not have otherwise occurred as 
readily as has subsequently transpired.
Equally notable is the positioning of these requirements within Article 6 of 
the UNFSA, a provision that articulates the intended application of the precau-
tionary approach to fisheries management and was considered revolutionary 
at the time.28 In this manner, the UNFSA reinforces a dichotomy that mak-
ing provision for the regulation of new and exploratory fisheries constitutes a 
core component of the application of the precautionary approach to fisheries 
management, and that such activities should in turn proceed in a graduated, 
monitored and precautionary manner.
This symbolism notwithstanding, taken on its own terms Article 6(6) has ar-
guably been of limited practical utility in framing specific regulatory responses 
to new and exploratory fisheries. Ratione materiae, these requirements are 
confined to the particular context of straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks. Likewise, despite the stated expansion of the scope of Articles 6 and 7 
to encompass ‘areas under national jurisdiction’,29 later practices and analyses 
have cast doubt as to whether this term is as clear-cut as it initially appears and 
27   Article 6(6) is also reproduced largely verbatim as Article 7.5.4 of the FAO Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries, albeit using the term ‘should’, where the UNFSA decrees ‘shall’.
28   See especially PGG Davies and C Redgwell, ‘The International Legal Regulation of 
Straddling Fish Stocks’ (1997) 67 British Yearbook of International Law 199–274, at pp. 259–
265; F Orrego Vicuña, The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1999) at p. 162; D Freestone, ‘Implementing Precaution 
Cautiously: The Precautionary Approach in the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks Agreement’ in E Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 1999) 287–325.
29   Article 3(1).
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suggest that it may be restricted solely to fisheries within the EEZ.30 Moreover, 
beyond a broad commitment to precautionary oversight and ensuring that the 
commercialisation of a new or exploratory fishery proceeds on a gradual basis, 
the UNFSA offers little indication as to the definitional thresholds of these 
terms or how this process is intended to operate in practice. This is perhaps un-
surprising, given that Article 6(6) is essentially reflective of contemporaneous 
developments within CCAMLR, which had not fully elaborated its regulatory 
model for new and exploratory fisheries by the time at which the UNFSA was 
concluded. Instead, the maturation of policies towards new and exploratory 
fisheries occurred exclusively within CCAMLR during the period between the 
drafting of the UNFSA and its formal entry into force in 2001, a process over 
which Article 6(6) ultimately exercised a negligible influence.
The guiding role of CCAMLR in the elaboration of Article 6(6) is clearly il-
lustrated by the submission of a draft convention prior to the conclusion of 
the initial negotiating text,31 which appears to have been the only procedural 
model for new and exploratory fisheries to have been tabled at the Fish Stocks 
Conference, and whose proponents were, with the exception of Iceland, 
CCAMLR Members at the material time and actively engaged in the process of 
developing regulatory guidance for pilot fisheries. With regard to ‘newly dis-
covered’ stocks, it was suggested that in order to provide for effective scientific 
review and assessment and to avoid delays in establishing effective control 
over such fisheries, the coastal states ‘in whose exclusive economic zone the 
stock occurs’ ought to assume management authority for an undefined ‘initial 
interim period’, following which responsibility would be vested in the relevant 
RFMO (or by agreement in the absence of such a body). Thereafter, measures 
should be established to allow for the gradual development of the fishery, 
alongside the introduction of precautionary management thresholds and by-
catch limits.32 Nevertheless, beyond a broad obligation for states to enter into 
30   M Tsamenyi and Q Hanich, ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Convention: 
Rights and Obligations in Maritime Zones under the Sovereignty of Coastal States’ (2012) 
27(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 783–793, at pp. 790–791.
31   Draft Convention submitted by Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand; 
Document A/CONF.164.L.11/Rev.1; reproduced in Lévy and Schram (n 13) at p. 176.
32   Ibid. This reference to the EEZ may be further suggestive of an intent to exclude areas 
under sovereignty from the scope of Article 3(1). The Draft Convention further specified 
that ‘[e]arly large-scale fisheries on newly discovered stocks shall be prohibited’, implying 
an emphasis upon restraint in the pursuit of new marine resources that has since been 
the general hallmark of CCAMLR in this respect, although the notion of a large-scale fish-
ery was also left undefined in this formulation.
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consultations with respect to new fisheries,33 no specific procedures were stip-
ulated within the UNFSA and the formulation of these requirements appears 
to have been essentially deferred to the individual RFMO in question.
Likewise, a US proposal for new and exploratory fisheries to be conducted 
pursuant to a specific data collection programme – which mirrored its volun-
tary practices within CCAMLR at the material time34 – also failed to graduate 
into the final version of the UNFSA,35 although in practice those RFMOs that 
have developed a clear policy on such fishing have subsequently insisted upon 
adherence to this procedure. Ultimately, given this drafting history, the regula-
tory intent of Article 6(6) is more appropriately interpreted by collating the 
extensive guiding practice of CCAMLR towards new and exploratory fisheries, 
a task to which this article now turns.
 New and Exploratory Fisheries in Antarctic Waters: The 
Development of the CCAMLR Regime
The CCAMLR regime is a central element of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 
under which the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources36 was concluded in 1980 and entered into force in 1982. The CAMLR 
Convention provided for the establishment of a management body, in the form 
of CCAMLR,37 which is supported by a Scientific Committee and its associated 
advisory fora, which act as consultative bodies to the Commission.38 The pri-
mary aim of the CAMLR Convention is articulated in Article II as being ‘the con-
servation of Antarctic marine living resources’,39 defined as ‘the populations 
33   Article 8(2).
34   See n 98 et seq.
35   GJ Hewison, ‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: An Environmental 
Perspective’ (1996) 11(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301–332, at p. 323.
36   Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Canberra, 20 May 
1980, in force 7 April 1982) 1329 UNTS 47 (‘CAMLR Convention’). Nevertheless, CCAMLR is 
not strictly an RFMO in the traditional sense, although it does perform fisheries functions 
within its geographical purview and ‘qualifies as an RFMO in the sense of the 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement’: EJ Molenaar, ‘CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries’ (2001) 16(3) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 465–499, at p. 496.
37   Article VII.
38   Article XIV.
39   Article II(1). Under Article II(2) this includes the ‘rational use’ of these resources, a con-
cept that is left undefined in the Convention.
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of fin fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living organisms, in-
cluding birds, found south of the Antarctic Convergence’.40 Article II(3) pre-
scribes a series of conservation principles for these resources, whereby parties 
undertake to ensure that the levels of harvested populations do not fall below 
that which would prevent stable recruitment, to maintain ecological relation-
ships between harvested, dependent and related populations and to prevent or 
minimise the risk of changes in the marine ecosystem that may not be revers-
ible over two to three decades. The approach of CCAMLR to new and explor-
atory fisheries is accordingly framed within the context of these overarching 
objectives.
Fishing activities in the CAMLR Convention Area are undertaken pre-
dominantly for Antarctic (Dissostichus mawsoni) and Patagonian toothfish 
(Dissostichus eleginoides) and krill (Euphausia superba), alongside smaller 
operations for other crustaceans and squid. As outlined below, new and ex-
ploratory fisheries have been established to at least some degree for all such 
species under the auspices of CCAMLR, particularly in respect of toothfish.
 ‘New’ and ‘Exploratory’ Fishing under CCAMLR
Concerns have long been expressed that fishing activities in the Southern 
Ocean ‘often started without adequate information being available to evalu-
ate the fishery potential or the possible adverse impacts on the target, depen-
dent or related populations’.41 Accordingly, on 9 October 1989, in its capacity 
as Convenor of the Working Group for the Development of Approaches to 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (WG-DAC), Australia cir-
culated a discussion paper addressing approaches to ‘new and developing 
fisheries, other than krill’,42 in which it was considered that CCAMLR should 
receive prior notification of any impending fishery so that it ‘may conduct a 
40   Article I(2).
41   Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XI), para. 4.27. On the exten-
sive history of experimental and exploratory fishing in these waters – which pre-dates 
the advent of CCAMLR by some margin – see K-H Kock, K Reid, J Croxall and S Nicol, 
‘Fisheries in the Southern Ocean: An Ecosystem Approach’ (2007) 362 Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B 2333–2349, at pp. 2334–2335.
42   Document WG-DAC 89/3. At the material time, krill fisheries were not subject to their own 
particular Conservation Measure under CCAMLR. A separate Working Group on Krill was 
inaugurated in 1989, shortly after the Australian proposal was tabled, through which krill-
specific fishing measures were intended to be developed. Nevertheless, as noted below, 
the regulatory regime for krill fishing has had an interpretive influence on new and ex-
ploratory fishing for toothfish under CCAMLR.
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preliminary evaluation of the fishery, and formulate approaches to conserva-
tion before the fishery develops beyond the exploratory phase’.43
Accompanying these suggestions, it was advocated that new or developing 
fisheries – as such endeavours were then termed in the CCAMLR vernacular – 
should be subject to two key stages of evaluation. In the Notification phase, 
consideration should be given to the ‘best scientific information available’ as 
to how the proposed fishery might interact with the wider Antarctic ecosys-
tem, alongside an appraisal of the difficulties in quantifying prospective im-
pacts upon both the target stock and dependent species. Thereafter, in the 
Assessment stage, CCAMLR would apply this information to investigate an 
upper level, below which the commercial development of the fishery may 
commence.44 At its Eighth Meeting, the parties therefore considered that de-
veloping fisheries ought to be subject to ‘some form of regulation’ so that they 
did not proceed more rapidly than the development of the data thresholds 
required to assess the potential ramifications of the fishery.45 To this end, the 
Scientific Committee was tasked with advising on the type of information re-
quired to assess potential yields and the ecological implications of the fishery, 
potential regulatory measures to be implemented during this process and an 
indication of the incumbent time scales so as to facilitate the eventual transi-
tion to full management.46
A Conservation Measure (CM) on new fisheries was duly adopted by 
CCAMLR at its Tenth Meeting in 1991.47 In the interim, a Swedish proposal 
that any such activities ought to be subject to advance notification was en-
dorsed by the parties48 and remains a fundamental element of the CCAMLR 
position concerning such fisheries. CM 31/X, which has since been replaced by 
CM 21-01, established the long-standing CCAMLR definition of a new fishery as 
being:
a fishery on a species using a particular fishing method in a statistical 
subarea or division for which:
43   Ibid., para 8.
44   Document WG-DAC 89/4: Approaches to Conservation in New and Developing Fisheries.
45   CCAMLR-VIII (n 16), para. 123.
46   Ibid.
47   CM 31/X: Notification that Members are Considering Initiating a New Fishery.
48   Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-IX), para 9.8. Broad support was 
expressed for the principle of advance notice, although a number of delegations raised 
concerns over ‘the legal implications of this measure, and appropriate definitions of new 
and developing fisheries’: ibid., para 9.7.
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(i) information on distribution, abundance, demography, potential 
yield and stock identity from comprehensive research/surveys or 
exploratory fishing have not been submitted to CCAMLR; or
(ii) catch and effort data have never been submitted to CCAMLR; or
(iii) catch and effort data from the two most recent seasons in which 
fishing occurred have not been submitted to CCAMLR.49
Under this construction, any notification of a fishery targeting a previously un-
fished species, new fishing ground or new fishing technique will in principle 
constitute a new fishery. Additionally, and in keeping with the entrenched reg-
ulatory position on VMEs outlined below, any proposed bottom-trawling in the 
high seas areas of the CAMLR Convention Area is deemed to be a new fishery 
and will require the prior approval of the Commission.50
Where a new fishery is proposed, the Member in question is required to 
provide notice of its intent to fish three months in advance of the next reg-
ular CCAMLR meeting.51 The applicant is also required to submit a Fishery 
Operation Plan (FOP), which will include a full outline of the nature of the new 
fishery, its location, target species, gear to be used and proposed minimum 
catch levels, alongside biological information on the target species, potential 
by-catches, comparable data from similar fisheries and possible impacts upon 
VMEs, especially benthic communities.52 Proposals are contingent upon a 
commitment to implement a Data Collection Plan (DCP) that may be estab-
lished for that fishery by the Scientific Committee; such fishing opportunities 
may then only be undertaken by vessels that are suitably equipped and config-
ured to comply with all relevant conservation measures.
Exploratory fishing, on the other hand, was first considered under the aus-
pices of CCAMLR in 1992, where concerns were expressed over past practices 
and the need to ensure that such fisheries ‘should not be allowed to expand fast-
er than the acquisition of information necessary to ensure that the fishery can 
and will be conducted in accordance with the principles set forth in Article II 
of the Convention’.53 With the previous position on new fisheries consid-
ered a ‘useful mechanism’ for precautionary regulation,54 alongside the clear 
49   CM 21-01: Notification that Members are Considering Initiating a New Fishery, Article 1.
50   Article 2 and Annex 21-01/A.
51   CM 21-01, Article 3(i).
52   Article 3(ii).
53   CCAMLR-XI (n 41), para. 4.28.
54   Ibid., para 4.30.
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advantages presented by a robust commitment towards prior notification,55 CM 
65/XII (since replaced by CM 21-02) was adopted at the subsequent CCAMLR 
Meeting. At this juncture, exploratory fishing was rather prosaically defined 
as ‘a fishery that was previously classified as a “new fishery” ’. An exploratory 
fishery retains this status unless and until sufficient information is forthcom-
ing to evaluate the distribution, abundance and demography of the target spe-
cies, so as to provide an estimate of the fishery’s potential yield, to review the 
impacts of the fishery upon dependent and related species and to allow the 
Scientific Committee to formulate and provide advice to the Commission on 
appropriate harvest catch levels, as well as effort levels and fishing gear, where 
appropriate.56
Similar obligations concerning the application process and data collection 
protocols established for new fisheries are required of those intending to enter 
notifications for exploratory fishing; hence such activities are also subject to 
the completion of a DCP and the prior submission of a FOP. Neither CM cur-
rently applies in the waters adjacent to the Kerguelen, Crozet or Prince Edward 
Islands, although the pertinent coastal states – France and South Africa re-
spectively – ‘agree in principle’ with these requirements and have undertaken 
to inform the Commission of research progress and results for any new or ex-
ploratory fisheries conducted in these waters.57
Although the definitional requirements of CM 21-01 and CM 21-02 appear 
relatively clear and unambiguous, the implementation of these provisions by 
CCAMLR has nonetheless provoked some intriguing and arguably inconsis-
tent outcomes. Issues of construction of the concepts of new and exploratory 
fisheries have arisen infrequently, but have predominantly concerned new 
methods of fishing for species that have been previously fished. Some such no-
tifications have involved the use of techniques that are familiar to many fishing 
grounds but are nonetheless new to the CAMLR Convention Area, and in one 
instance novel technology was deployed for the fishing of krill. The manage-
ment responses are revealing as to how strictly the definitional requirements 
outlined in these measures have been applied by CCAMLR, especially in the 
context of notifications by purported new participants.
55   Ibid., para 4.32.
56   Para 1(ii) of CM 21-02.
57   Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XII), para 8.6. Indeed, one 
of the first new fisheries to be established was developed within these waters by South 
Africa, which pledged that the spirit of the relevant provisions ‘will be followed closely 
in managing the fishery’: Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-
XIV), para 6.3.
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The first significant evaluation by CCAMLR of the definitional parameters 
of new and exploratory fisheries occurred in 2005,58 concerning proposals for 
a technique termed ‘continuous krill fishing’. Unlike traditional pelagic trawls, 
continuous fishing involves a pumping mechanism whereby air is injected 
into the cod-end of the net (i.e., the segment in which the catch is retained), 
funnelling a constant stream of krill into the vessel. This method offers the 
advantages of enhanced selectivity and a greater proportion of live krill taken 
in the catch; unlike traditional trawling, there is less scope for individual krill 
to be crushed in the net prior to landing. Continuous fishing appears to have 
been first undertaken on a tentative basis in the 2004/05 fishing season by a 
Vanuatu-flagged vessel, subsequently re-registered to Norway, following which 
the Norwegian delegation notified the Commission of its intentions to develop 
this technique more extensively for the following year.59
The question as to how the apparent novelty of this technique might af-
fect the classification of these fishing efforts caused a degree of consternation 
within the Commission. Despite some reservations, the Scientific Committee 
acknowledged that krill fishing is evolving with regard to the pattern of op-
eration, harvesting technology and participants and, accordingly, continu-
ous fishing would not in its view be considered a form of new or exploratory 
fishing ‘if there is an adequate description of the selectivity of the method for 
krill, a characterisation of the haul (or catch rate) and information on the lo-
cation of krill catches’.60 This interpretation was challenged by Russia, which 
58   Elements of new fishing techniques had been sporadically raised prior to this. In 2002, 
Australia notified the Commission of its intention to introduce long-lining for Patagonian 
toothfish in an established fishery in Division 58.5.2. As the notification was ‘not for-
mally’ one for new or exploratory fishing, it was considered sufficient that the propos-
ing Member had given advance notice of these adjustments and of the management 
provisions planned for that fishery: Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission 
(CCAMLR-XXI), para 9.4. Meanwhile, in 2004, the Scientific Committee failed to reach 
consensus over the definitional status of the proposed introduction of a limited de-
gree of bottom-trawling, interspersed with mid-water trawls, for icefish: Report of the 
Twenty-Third Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXIII), paras 4.127–4.134. 
Unmodified bottom-trawling had been previously classed as a new fishery by both the 
notifying Member (Australia) and the Scientific Committee: Report of the Twenty-First 
Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXI), para 5.6.
59   Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXIV ), paras 4.23–
4.24. There is no official record of prior consideration by CCAMLR of the status of these 
activities until they were transferred to Norwegian supervision.
60   Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXIV ), 
para 4.8.
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considered that continuous fishing should be classified as an exploratory fish-
ery until comprehensive data on its selectivity, the characteristics of the haul 
and species composition, location of the catches and haul duration had been 
generated and considered fully by the Scientific Committee.61 The Russian 
approach failed to attract further support and a degree of continuous fishing 
has prevailed in the CCAMLR krill fishery, notwithstanding a clear subsequent 
acknowledgment that this method has ‘presented some unique challenges to 
recording effective fishing effort, catch and collection of biological data and 
by-catch data’.62 Perhaps mindful of these challenges, the operators of this 
system have complied assiduously with data-collection requirements, even if 
these have been formulated in the context of commercial krill fishing, as op-
posed to the specific regime for exploratory fishing in the CAMLR Convention 
Area. Although commentators have previously expressed reservations that 
‘the use of this system to reduce the ecosystem effects of fishing is still largely 
unproven because of its novelty’,63 continuous fishing and cod-end pumping 
have nonetheless been endorsed by CCAMLR as accepted krill fishing tech-
niques in these waters.64
The consideration by CCAMLR of the Norwegian continuous fishing meth-
od stands in marked contrast to that of a subsequent proposal by the Cook 
Islands to access the krill fishery. The Cook Islands acceded to the CAMLR 
Convention in 2005 and, in 2007, notified the Commission of its intention to 
commence pair trawling for krill. This was met with concerted opposition from 
a number of Members, which considered that as pair trawling had not been 
previously deployed in the Convention Area, it constituted a new method of 
catching krill and should therefore be more appropriately treated as a ‘new’ 
fishery.65 The Cook Islands contended that the proposed activity was not a new 
fishery and instead involved a mid-water trawl pursuant to the standard FAO 
61   CCAMLR-XIV (n 59), para 4.26.
62   Report of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXV ), para 4.42. At this 
juncture Russia again sought unsuccessfully to reclassify these endeavours as an explor-
atory fishery, on the basis that this would not impede the development of the fishery, 
while the specific framework for exploratory fishing activities might actually overcome 
some of the methodological and organisational difficulties experienced in implementing 
this new system: ibid., para 13.6.
63   S Nicol, J Foster and S Kawaguchi, ‘The Fishery for Antarctic Krill – Recent Developments’ 
(2012) 13(1) Fish and Fisheries 30–40, at p. 32.
64   CM 21-03: Notifications of Intent to Participate in a Fishery for Euphausia superba; 
Annex A.
65   See in particular the response of New Zealand: Report of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the 
Commission (CCAMLR-XXVI), para 4.40.
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definition of such operations and was in essence ‘the same method as cur-
rently employed in the fishery, which has already been substantially modified 
without consequence’.66 Nevertheless, the Commission considered that the 
proposal should be resubmitted in the following year as a notification for a 
new fishery, on the basis that there was no prior information on the impact, 
selectivity or catch data for the use of this method in the Convention Area, as 
required under CM 21-01.67
Taken on these terms, however, the practical distinction between the noti-
fication by the Cook Islands for pair trawling and the preceding deployment 
by Norway of the continuous fishing system is not immediately apparent: 
arguably neither notification would have technically met the conditions of 
CM 21-01 on an equally strict construction. Although CCAMLR has not been 
subsequently called upon to interpret the qualifying threshold for a new or 
exploratory fishery, the divergence between these approaches is nonetheless 
suggestive of a degree of inconsistency in the application of these require-
ments which, whether by accident or design, has operated in practice to the 
benefit of an existing Member of the Commission, yet to the detriment of a 
purported new participant in the krill fishery.68
A final issue concerning the interpretation of new and exploratory fisheries 
under CCAMLR relates to the position of so-called ‘lapsed’ fisheries, which have 
been abandoned for primarily commercial reasons. A fishery is deemed to be 
lapsed ‘when an assessment is no longer current’,69 a position not dissimilar to 
the knowledge base concerning new and exploratory fisheries. If a degree of 
fishing does eventually resume in these areas – which has not occurred thus 
far – it appears that they will ‘be reopened according to precautionary prin-
ciples’ which will involve prior notification and a commitment to further data 
66   Ibid., para 13.20.
67   Ibid., para 13.21.
68   The Cook Islands has not yet submitted a revised application for new fishing for krill 
using pair trawls and the prospects for such a notification thereby remain a matter of 
conjecture. It may be speculated whether, in principle, another new entrant might have 
proved more successful, or whether a ‘conventional trawl’ as envisaged by CM 21-03 might 
have received a warmer response, given that New Zealand had expressed particular – and 
highly influential – concerns over the Cook Islands’ proposal: ibid., paras 13.10–13.13.
69   Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XVII), para 
5.26. As a case in point, having received no notifications or reports of fishing for a number 
of years, in 2009 CCAMLR declared a previous exploratory fishery for squid to have lapsed 
and the provisions pertaining to it – CM 61-01 – were duly excised from the Schedule of 
Conservation Measures in Force: Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Commission 
(CCAMLR-XXVIII), para 4.41.
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collection.70 If data are insufficient to make a satisfactory assessment before 
resuming fishing activities, a lapsed fishery will instead revert to a new fishery 
and will be subject to the procedures of CM 21-01.71 In either case, both avenues 
towards an eventual resumption of fishing in lapsed areas will accordingly be 
subject to precautionary management practices. A parallel position applies to 
fisheries that have been formally ‘closed’ by CCAMLR for conservation reasons, 
although as noted below, fishing for research purposes is currently undertaken 
in these areas in a manner that generally differs little from exploratory fishing, 
aside from its formal classification and oversight.
 Access to New and Exploratory Fisheries
Participation in new and exploratory fisheries under CCAMLR is restricted 
solely to current Members of that body.72 This initially raised concerns as to 
the position of individual Member States of the European Union (EU) and, 
more specifically, whether those EU Member States that had yet to accede to 
the CAMLR Convention could exploit the general access entitlements awarded 
collectively to the EU to participate in exploratory fisheries, while conveniently 
by-passing the need to become a concurrent Member of CCAMLR, as was pur-
portedly the case for Portugal in 1999.73
Aside from a clear position on funding,74 the EU has only recently adopt-
ed legislation to regulate specific aspects of exploratory fishing pursuant to 
its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP),75 although a significant volume of such 
70   Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XVI), para 10.3.
71   SC-CCAMLR-XVII (n 69), para 5.26.
72   Para 5 of CM 21-02. This position is rather more implicit in relation to new fisheries under 
current CCAMLR rules, as CM 21-01 is ultimately silent on this requirement. However, a 
presumption that Members will establish and access new fisheries only under their own 
flags has constituted a distinct element of CCAMLR practice towards new fisheries from 
a preliminary stage: Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XV ), 
para 8.27.
73   Report of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XVIII), paras 9.42–9.52.
74   Public funding is not available for exploratory funding under current EU rules: see 
Articles 15(1) and 19(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 498/2007 of 26 March 2007 lay-
ing down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 
on the European Fisheries Fund [2007] Official Journal L120/1; see further R Churchill 
and D Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 
pp. 524–527.
75   Regulation (EU) No. 2016/2336 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December 2016 establishing specific conditions for fishing deep-sea stocks in the 
north-east Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the north-east 
Atlantic and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 2347/2002 [2016] Official Journal 
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fishing is undertaken outside Community waters by vessels of EU Member 
States, both within and beyond areas of national jurisdiction.76 In the context 
of CCAMLR, following staunch opposition by a number of Members, which 
insisted that the Portuguese arrangement ‘should not set a precedent’,77 a clear 
position was subsequently enshrined in the core EU Regulation on access to 
fishing opportunities under the CFP, specifying that ‘[o]nly those Member 
States which are members of the CCAMLR Commission’ may participate in 
certain named exploratory fisheries in these waters.78
Beyond the specific context of EU fishing entitlements, the general require-
ment for CCAMLR Membership does not seemingly prevent a vessel from 
being reflagged mid-season to another Member to avail itself of more than 
one set of exploratory fishing opportunities in any given year. Where this is 
contemplated, the vessel must have completed the relevant registration proce-
dures required by the authorities of the notified Member before entering that 
specific fishery.79 Reflagging in this particular context offers some advantage 
to the operator, since numerical restrictions have been placed upon access to 
nationally registered vessels in certain exploratory fisheries under particular 
L 354/1. Under Article 8 the European Commission may approve applications for explor-
atory fishing at depths up to 800m in locations beyond those in which existing fishing 
activities had occurred. On the development of the new legislation see GA Oanta, ‘The 
European Union’s Reform of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the North-East Atlantic’ (2017) 32(3) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 589–600, at pp. 593–596.
76   Although little regulated within EU waters, this issue has nonetheless constituted a signif-
icant component of the EU’s system of Fisheries Partnership Agreements, concluded with 
a series of developing states, for which the majority have considered exploratory fishing 
to at least some degree. Indeed, provisions on exploratory activities have been elabo-
rated in the case of Gabon, Guinea, Kiribati, Mozambique, the Seychelles, the Solomon 
Islands and, especially, Mauritania, which provides for extensive regulation: see further 
N van der Burgt, The Contribution of International Fisheries Law to Human Development: 
An Analysis of Multilateral and ACP-EU Fisheries Instruments (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston/
Leiden, 2013) at p. 300. As noted above (n 75) exploratory fisheries have also been pursued 
by EU-flagged vessels in the international waters of the north-east Atlantic region.
77   CCAMLR-XVIII (n 73), para 9.52.
78   Council Regulation (EU) 2016/72 fixing for 2016 the fishing opportunities for certain fish 
stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing ves-
sels, in certain non-Union waters, and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/104 [2016] Official 
Journal L 22/1; Article 26(1).
79   This position was clarified in 2011 in relation to the Antarctic Chieftain, a longstanding 
participant in exploratory fisheries that has alternated between the registries of Australia 
and New Zealand for particular fishing activities: Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the 
Commission (CCAMLR-XXX), para 11.7; see also CM 21-02, para 5.
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CMs.80 This is not the generic position for all exploratory fisheries, however: 
at a preliminary stage in the development of rules on exploratory fishing, the 
Members expressly rejected the principle of ‘one member, one vessel’ as ap-
plied in the specific context of crab fishing as having set a wider precedent for 
such endeavours generally,81 hence there is little incentive towards the whole-
sale reflagging of exploratory fishing vessels.
Access to new and exploratory fishing opportunities in the CCAMLR Area 
is contingent upon a record of good conduct, with rights of participation 
denied to any vessel that has been listed as having participated in Illegal, 
Unreported or Unregulated (IUU) fishing pursuant to CMs 10-06 and 10-07.82 
Various CCAMLR Members have trenchantly opposed any softening of this 
position,83 although, as Serdy observes, this stance does little to deter serial 
recidivism in a region that has long generated concerns over the prevalence 
of illicit fishing.84 Indeed, neither of the pertinent CMs proffer a mechanism 
for the eventual rehabilitation of offending vessels in the context of new and 
exploratory fisheries. Provisional listing would also appear to disqualify a ves-
sel from future exploratory fishing, in the view of a majority of Members,85 as 
would a failure to demonstrate that a vessel reasonably suspected of being in 
breach of other fishing rules has been subsequently deprived of the benefits of 
its activities.86 Likewise, there has been growing frustration towards the failure 
80   See, for instance, CM 41-11.
81   CCAMLR-XIV (n 57), para. 8.42.
82   See para 9 of CM 21-01 and para 13 of CM 21-02.
83   Indeed, as argued by New Zealand – and enthusiastically supported by numerous other 
delegations – accepting purported notifications from vessels with a poor record of com-
pliance with the various CCAMLR restrictions ‘would make the Commission the object of 
public derision’: Report of the Twenty-First Meeting (n 58), para 8.23.
84   A Serdy, ‘Antarctic Fisheries Management’ in EJ Molenaar, AG Oude Elferink and 
D Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions: Interactions between Global and 
Regional Regimes (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2013) 217–242, at p. 234. Individual 
Members have argued that a denial of access on this basis merely serves to perpetuate 
a cycle of IUU fishing – which remains a significant problem in a number of exploratory 
fisheries – although no agreement has yet been achieved on this issue: CCAMLR-XXVI 
(n 65), paras 10.44–10.46.
85   This point was raised in 2007 in relation to the Volna, a Russian-flagged vessel that had 
seemingly fished in the CCAMLR Area without notification and shortly thereafter sought 
to undertake exploratory fishing. Russia considered this to have been a domestic over-
sight, but found little support from the other Members for the future participation of this 
vessel in any of the CCAMLR exploratory fisheries: CCAMLR-XXVI, ibid., para 10.64.
86   This position arose in 2016, in the absence of confirmation that a Korean-flagged vessel 
had dumped an allegedly illegal catch and had thus been fully deprived of any apparent 
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to fulfil the data-collection requirements of CM 21-01 and, especially, CM 21-02, 
which may constitute sufficient grounds ‘for denying specific vessels future ac-
cess to new and exploratory fisheries’.87 The precise degree of leeway accorded 
to non-compliant vessels to remedy their conduct remains somewhat uncer-
tain, although the strong reservations expressed towards particular vessels 
have tended to inspire pre-emptive action by the flag states to remove these 
participants from the fishery, rather than further testing the collective patience 
of the other Members.88
Where a new or exploratory fishery is established within the CAMLR 
Convention Area, and the various intended participants have met the relevant 
criteria for a successful notification, access to those fisheries will proceed on 
an equal and open basis between the Members. In this respect, and perhaps to 
the chagrin of those who have facilitated the development of a viable fishery 
ab initio, such operators will seemingly not receive favourable treatment once 
an exploratory fishery has transitioned to full commercial management.
It has been suggested that, in the context of the high seas, Article 119(1)(a) 
of the LOSC could be interpreted to support a degree of preferential treatment 
for particular companies, in a manner broadly analogous to the ‘pioneer’ status 
granted to certain seabed mining operators that have played a significant role 
in pursuing the technological innovations necessary to allow for the exploi-
tation of these resources.89 The LOSC is ultimately silent on the position of 
pioneer fishers and it appears unlikely that the creation of ‘favourable condi-
tions’ for research opportunities envisaged under Article 243 extends to com-
mercial inducements for pilot activities, having been primarily considered in 
the context of removing geopolitical obstacles to scientific endeavour.90 There 
benefits of this activity. The Members agreed that exploratory fishing could not be un-
dertaken by this vessel until this issue had been fully resolved: Report of the Thirty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXXV), para 3.13.
87   See in particular the comments of the US delegation, which attracted considerable sup-
port among the other Members: Report of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Commission 
(CCAMLR-XXIX), para 12.37.
88   Korea, for instance, has been prompted to withdraw purported notifications for explor-
atory fishing due to clear opposition from other Members over records of compliance: see 
further below n 110 et seq.
89   EJ Molenaar, ‘The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of 2000 and Other Initiatives on 
Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy’ (2001) 16(1) International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 77–124, at pp. 114–115.
90   The requirement to remove obstacles to research, which was not ultimately incorporated 
into Article 243, was advocated as a means of ensuring that scientific cooperation would 
not be stymied by Cold War constraints: S Rosenne and A Yankov (eds), United Nations 
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is nonetheless an attractive logic to this argument, not least from the perspec-
tive of entrepreneurial fishing interests that have borne the financial risks and 
development costs incumbent in the fishery and the effort of facilitating the 
acquisition of the requisite data, but must then relinquish exclusivity to the 
benefit of enterprises that may have invested little or nothing in the eventual 
creation of a new fishery.
Fisheries ‘pioneers’ with a strong record of compliance with catch restric-
tions and data management requirements may nevertheless receive favour-
able treatment by their respective domestic authorities.91 This is not without 
significance in the context of new and exploratory fisheries, where particu-
lar states have adopted increasingly stringent requirements for the national 
endorsement of purported notifications.92 Nevertheless, there appears to be 
limited support for this approach within wider multilateral practice. At a pre-
liminary stage in the formation of its policies towards new and exploratory 
fisheries, CCAMLR specified that such areas could not be reserved for the per-
sonal use of those who had pioneered their development and ‘reaffirmed its 
understanding that none of these measures should in any way imply the scope 
and limitation to future participatory rights of individual Members for those 
fisheries. Members not currently participating in the new or exploratory fish-
eries will be entitled to enter the fisheries in subsequent exploratory or other 
phases on an equal basis’.93
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume IV (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1990) at pp. 474–478.
91   Molenaar (n 89) at p. 115. Such a trend is discernible in Australian practice, for instance, 
which has incentivized domestic benefits for pioneer fishers.
92   See for instance Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Guide to CCAMLR New 
and Exploratory Fisheries (AFMA, Canberra, 2015) at pp. 7–8 (stating that notifications 
from Australian-flagged vessels will only be supported where they advance the national 
interest).
93   CCAMLR-XV (n 72), para 9.13. A degree of assistance did however appear to be forthcoming 
to the US in its intended prosecution of the Area 48.3 crab fishery, as new notifications to 
this fishery were contingent upon fulfilling the Phase I research requirements of prior ex-
perimental fishing, which the individual US operator was considered to have met: Report 
of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XIX), paras 2.26 and 
5.114. In principle, this would have given fishers that had completed these requirements a 
temporary advantage over other operators, at least while the conservative management 
scheme envisaged under CM 181/XVIII was considered necessary. However, the fishery 
proved not to be commercially viable, and whereas the requirements of this measure are 
still technically applicable even in the absence of fishing activity, this benefit remains 
rather illusory in this particular context.
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Some scope for preferential treatment is tentatively considered under the 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and the 
South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), which are the only other 
bodies thus far to have engaged – albeit peripherally – with this question. The 
SPRFMO Convention expressly states that the ‘contribution to the responsible 
development of new or exploratory fisheries’ will be taken into account as 
a criterion in future participation in commercial fisheries.94 In and of itself, 
however, it is unclear whether this provision actively promotes the interests of 
pioneers or is instead intended to apply more punitively to vessels that breach 
the conditions for the conduct of exploratory fishing or consistently and un-
reasonably fail to return adequate data. As noted below, the limited practice 
of SPRFMO in this regard is suggestive of a more circumspect approach: re-
cent measures concerning new and exploratory fisheries have stated categori-
cally that such activities ‘will not be considered to be a precedent for future 
allocation decisions’,95 notwithstanding the tenor of Article 21(1)(i). Likewise, 
although the SEAFO Convention contains a similar clause,96 practice has been 
insufficient to confirm any degree of divergent intent to the CCAMLR position 
on pioneer fisheries in alternative fora.
Most significant, perhaps, in this regard is the negotiating history of 
Article 6(6) of the UNFSA, which is ultimately silent on the matter of indi-
vidual privileges and implies a more egalitarian position within any resultant 
commercial fishery. During the Third Session of the negotiations, the new and 
exploratory fisheries clause of the Revised Negotiating Text was amended to 
include an obligation that conservative measures ‘should be established as 
soon as possible in cooperation with those initiating the fishery’.97 Tellingly, 
94   Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the 
South Pacific Ocean (Auckland, 14 November 2009, in force 24 August 2012) [2012] ATS 28; 
Article 22(1)(i).
95   CMM 4.13 (Exploratory Fisheries; 2016) para 20; see n 155 et seq.
96   Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South-
East Atlantic Ocean (Windhoek, 20 April 2001, in force 30 April 2003) 2221 UNTS 189; 
Article 20(1)(f) states that in determining the nature and extent of participatory rights 
in fishing opportunities, the Commission will consider, inter alia, ‘contributions to new 
or exploratory fisheries, taking account of the principles set out in article 6.6 of the 1995 
Agreement’.
97   Document A/CONF.164/13.Rev.1 of 30 March 1994; reproduced in Lévy and Schram 
(n 13) at p. 440 (emphasis added). Little indication is publicly available as to the intend-
ed degree of cooperation required and the implications of this privileged status in this 
relatively short-lived version of the draft provision. Given the strong assertions of equal 
rights of access within CCAMLR at the material time, this suggested obligation appears to 
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however, this wording was swiftly expunged from the text at the Fourth Session 
and remained absent from the final version of the UNFSA, representing a clear 
rejection of additional consultative entitlements for pioneer fishers.
 The Management of New and Exploratory Fisheries under CCAMLR
The management of new and exploratory fisheries within the Southern Ocean 
has involved a concerted degree of regulatory improvisation on the part of the 
CCAMLR institutions. These policies were initially developed for king and stone 
crabs, which represented a pro-regime for the regulation of new and explorato-
ry fisheries under CCAMLR, and have subsequently become more streamlined 
and standardised through a variety of CMs applied to specific toothfish fisher-
ies that emerged in the late 1990s.
New fisheries were first deliberated within CCAMLR in 1990, when the US 
approved a domestic application for small-scale crab fishing in Area 48.3, al-
though this permit was not ultimately used due to the prevailing weather con-
ditions. The following year, in the light of agreement over the need for advance 
notice, the US voluntarily submitted a new application by the same operator 
to the Scientific Committee for a review of its research and data collection 
plan and accompanying environmental impact assessment, a move that was 
considered a ‘useful example’ of the steps needed to fulfil the requirements 
of (then) CM 31/X.98 Under (then) CM 60/XI, the fishery was closed until a 
workshop could be convened to formalise the requisite data collection regime, 
pending the application of a ‘conservative management strategy’.99 To this 
end, the fishery was subsequently reclassified as ‘exploratory’ – a designation 
that prompted some initial unease in the absence of a clear definition of the 
term at that stage100 – and prospective fishers were required to first complete 
an Experimental Harvest Regime before the more specific requirements of the 
conservative management strategy as elaborated in (then) CM 181/XVIII would 
have been derived instead from the earlier draft convention tabled by Argentina, Canada, 
Chile, Iceland and New Zealand, which envisaged a stronger degree of initial manage-
ment authority by coastal states and obligations of consultation if the fishery was not 
subsequently subsumed under the control of an RFMO.
98   Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-X), para 6.11.
99   CCAMLR-XI (n 41), para 9.49. This process clearly influenced the concurrent UNFSA nego-
tiations, with the new and exploratory fishing clause of the draft text also (then) advocat-
ing ‘conservative’ limits to be imposed on such activities: Document A/CONF.164/13 of 23 
November 1993; reproduced in Lévy and Schram (n 13) at p. 75.
100   CCAMLR-XIV (n 57), para 8.37.
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be applied.101 The fishery nevertheless swiftly fell into abeyance for economic 
reasons and, notwithstanding a brief Russian programme of experimental 
fishing, only ever yielded meagre harvests of crabs. It thus appears unlikely 
to be resurrected as an active concern. Nevertheless, this fishery has not been 
reclassified as either lapsed or closed and the regulatory regime considered 
under CM 52-01 would still apply to these stocks in framing any eventual transi-
tion to full management.
Seven exploratory fisheries, each of which concern toothfish,102 are cur-
rently operational within the CCAMLR network, with varying degrees of par-
ticipation. In addition to the general requirements prescribed under CMs 
21-01 and 21-02 for the notification of new and exploratory fisheries, particular 
conditions – including tagging obligations, observer coverage and data collec-
tion protocols – are established under CM 41-01 for the conduct of these ac-
tivities, and limits on each exploratory fishery are prescribed through further 
individual CMs.103 This regulatory framework – which imposes clear restric-
tions upon fishing effort and retains a strong focus on prior approval, continu-
ous scientific review and universal observer coverage – represents in principle 
a significant illustration of the precautionary approach to the management of 
vulnerable fish stocks and ecosystems in the face of considerable uncertainty.
In this respect, a degree of cautious optimism is appropriate. Despite the 
steady expansion of exploratory fishing within the CAMLR Convention Area, 
compliance with individual catch limits and observer coverage has generally 
101   See further M Belchier, T Peatman and J Brown, ‘The Biology Ecology and Development 
of Fishery Management Advice for the Anomuran Crabs at South Georgia (CCAMLR 
Subarea 48.3)’ (2012) 19 CCAMLR Science 1–15, at pp. 10–11 (raising concerns about the sus-
tainability of the enterprise if the precautionary limits were to be consistently reached). 
CM 52-01 currently applies to this fishery, within which the experimental harvest regime 
is now reproduced in Annex 52-01/B.
102   There is also some scope for tuna fishing activities, a species with a chequered history of 
under-regulated catches within the CAMLR Convention Area: see further A Hemmings, 
‘Regime Overlap in the Southern Ocean: The Case of Southern Bluefin Tuna and CCSBT 
in the CCAMLR Area’ (2006) 3 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 207–217. In 
October 2015 an Arrangement was concluded between CCAMLR and the Commission for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). Participants in both organizations 
have generally agreed to pursue tuna allocations through the CCSBT, and CCAMLR has 
urged any future tuna fishing occurring within the CAMLR Convention Area to be regu-
lated under the regime of new and exploratory fisheries: CCAMLR-XXV (n 62), para 16.40. 
Additionally, in October 2017, a small number CCAMLR Members indicated their inten-
tion to pursue exploratory fisheries for finfish in future seasons.
103   The limits for each exploratory fishery are established, respectively, under CMs 41-04, 41-
05, 41-06, 41-07, 41-09, 41-10 and 41-11.
30 Caddell
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33 (2018) 1–62
remained high. Catches in accordance with exploratory fishing protocols have 
predominantly met the prescribed limits for these fisheries, notwithstand-
ing a small number of non-egregious breaches in individual fishing seasons. 
However, the management of new and exploratory fisheries under CCAMLR 
has not been without complications, for which some reservations may be legit-
imately expressed concerning the implementation of data-collection require-
ments. These concerns are not without significance, since the acquisition of 
data remains a core obligation under CMs 21-01 and 21-02 and ultimately con-
stitutes the primary justification for both the initiation and the continuation of 
new and exploratory fisheries sanctioned within these waters.
Challenges in securing appropriate and sufficient data have been appar-
ent since the inception of the CCAMLR exploratory fishing regime where, de-
spite strong interest in pursuing these burgeoning opportunities as reflected 
by the considerable number of notifications for new and exploratory fisher-
ies, relatively few such allocations were initially used. Although the thresh-
old requirements are moderately low – a new fishery is deemed to have been 
prosecuted ‘if some fishing effort had been applied’104 – for a number of years 
CCAMLR’s new and exploratory fisheries were generally characterised by 
inactivity.105 This presented significant practical and financial difficulties for 
the Scientific Committee which, while loathe to act punitively towards un-
prosecuted notifications,106 was nonetheless obliged to expend considerable 
time and resources in reviewing each application in good faith, while receiving 
104   CCAMLR-XV (n 72), para. 9.10. Although prosaically expressed, this is a significant distinc-
tion, because a prosecuted new fishery will be accordingly reclassified as an exploratory 
fishery in subsequent seasons.
105   Only a fraction of the initial notifications received by CCAMLR for new and exploratory 
fisheries were ultimately prosecuted: see further DGM Miller, EN Sabourenkov and DC 
Ramm, ‘Managing Antarctic Marine Living Resources: The CCAMLR Approach’ (2004) 
19(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 317–363, at p. 328.
106   Unprosecuted notifications (i.e., notifications that were never ultimately pursued in that 
particular season) were rarely vexatious, however, with fishers often postponing their 
exploratory operations due to unduly hazardous nautical conditions in an extreme en-
vironment, unanticipated financial issues or, indeed, to improve their capacity to return 
meaningful data. Accordingly, it was considered ‘inappropriate for the Commission to 
use sanctions as a means of reducing the number of such notifications’: Report of the 
Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XX), para 7.6. Nevertheless, the Scientific 
Committee – which is rather more directly affected by this problem than the Commission – 
has suggested that future fishing opportunities ought to be withheld for contracting par-
ties that routinely fail to implement their notifications: Report of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting 
of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXVI), para 3.46.
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paltry data in return. This process has since been streamlined further, provid-
ing clearer scope for the Scientific Committee to reject poorly formulated or 
untimely notifications and placing the initial burden of costs more directly 
upon the applicant,107 thereby mitigating this problem to a significant degree.
Notwithstanding high levels of compliance with effort restrictions in ex-
ploratory fisheries, concerns have been raised that data monitoring require-
ments have been circumvented by particular vessels, as deficiencies in tagging 
programmes (or, perhaps more pertinently, the retention of larger fish and 
the tag-and-release of less commercially valuable individuals) have threat-
ened to distort and undermine the knowledge base generated by exploratory 
activities.108 In this respect, CCAMLR has broadly favoured the use of the car-
rot over that of the stick, having endorsed a tagging lottery launched in 2013 
by the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) to incentivise effective 
monitoring programmes. Stronger sanctions remain, however, and a persistent 
failure to comply with the requirements of CM 21-02 ought in principle to bar a 
vessel from future exploratory fishing.109 Indeed, a history of providing anoma-
lous data has seen at least two vessels unilaterally withdrawn from the fishery 
by the flag state and subsequently precluded from further exploratory fishing 
opportunities.110
Some difficulties have also been posed by changes in personnel involved 
in exploratory fisheries, with experienced operators that had gained an af-
finity with the practical demands of research fishing having been steadily re-
placed by crews that are less accomplished at performing these requirements.111 
Nevertheless as CCAMLR has observed, poor data management is rather more 
107   Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXII), para 3.19. Since 
2003, an assessment fee has been levied for each individual notification, whereas in 2016, 
CMs 21-01 and 21-02 were revised to stipulate that notifications for new and exploratory 
fishing will be subject to ‘an administrative cost-recovery scheme and shall therefore be 
accompanied by a payment per vessel’.
108   Report of the Thirty-First Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXXI), para 
3.127.
109   See the discussion at n 87 et seq.
110   Report of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXXII), para 5.63. The 
Korean-flagged vessels in question were subsequently considered to have committed IUU 
fishing and would accordingly be disqualified from future exploratory fishing under the 
requirements of CM 21-02. It is illuminating to note that considerable pressure was ap-
plied by the other Members for the flag state to act decisively in this respect.
111   Report of the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment 2012, para 5.21. This body has raised 
concerns as to the prospective implications of these less culpable errors on the evaluation 
and implementation of research plans.
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frequently attributable to the ‘low commitment’ of particular vessels towards 
implementing research plans112 and practical errors in setting research hauls,113 
both of which are factors for which the threat of more permanent conse-
quences could inspire rapid methodological improvements. Indeed, some del-
egations have argued that past tagging performance should also be reviewed 
when evaluating notifications, given the considerable variability experienced 
between particular operators in this respect,114 although it has not as yet been 
deemed necessary to impose this approach as an official management policy.
Where pertinent information has been forthcoming, concerns have also 
been raised by the Scientific Committee that a number of participants in ex-
ploratory fisheries have consistently failed to return meaningful data on ma-
rine ecosystems or dependent species, tending instead to focus primarily upon 
assessments of the target stock.115 Indeed, individual Members have observed 
that notifications for exploratory fishing have often neglected to include refer-
ence to dependent or related species or other ecosystem considerations, not-
withstanding the clear requirements of CM 21-02.116 Although the commercial 
promise vested in exploratory fishing renders stock assessment a natural prior-
ity for fishers, the lack of attention to these factors has not been substantively 
addressed, which has clear implications for the ability of CCAMLR to advance 
the precautionary management of such fisheries. Managing the information 
that has been received nevertheless also raises practical difficulties, as valu-
able data on the wider environment generated by exploratory fishing has not 
always been effectively administered: for instance, studies on the role of fish 
within the Antarctic ecosystem ‘has not typically found a home within work-
ing groups’ growing commitments’.117
Data-collection challenges have been further compounded by the variable 
participation within exploratory fisheries pursued under CCAMLR, which ren-
ders the volume and quantity of information yielded from such fishing highly 
uneven. At one end of the scale, in certain exploratory fisheries – notably those 
of the Ross Sea in Divisions 88.1 and 88.2 – a comparatively high number of 
vessels have notified their intent to pursue an ultimately modest collective 
112   CCAMLR-XXVIII (n 69), para 11.7.
113   Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXVIII), 
para 11.7.
114   CCAMLR-XXIX (n 87), para 11.21.
115   Report of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXXIV), para 9.19.
116   See especially the comments of the Swedish delegation, ibid., para 9.19.
117   Report of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXXIV ), 
para 3.160.
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allocation. This has raised the spectre of over-capacity in these waters, and 
the Scientific Committee has repeatedly warned that exploratory fisheries may 
become unsustainable if they are consistently fished to the full extent noti-
fied by the Members. This trend is nonetheless perpetuated by the current 
‘Olympic-style’ fishing arrangements for these waters, since the unresolved 
question of sovereignty in Antarctica precludes the allocation of fishing op-
portunities via controlled national quotas, as may be imposed under more or-
thodox RFMOs.
In 2011, the Commission urged ‘restraint’ in the development of particular 
exploratory fisheries and called upon the Members to apply internal restric-
tions upon capacity and effort in such endeavours.118 This call has been heeded 
by the main participants: the Australian authorities, for instance, have signifi-
cantly strengthened the approval process for exploratory fishing, specifying 
that notifications will only be supported if they are in the national interest and 
meet stringent domestic requirements,119 while New Zealand has on occasion 
voluntarily withdrawn notifications in response to CCAMLR’s concerns over 
sustainability.120
Although the prospect of over-capacity within the Ross Sea remains a lin-
gering concern, CCAMLR has been consistently confronted with the converse 
problem in other exploratory fisheries, which have remained generally under-
subscribed and are unlikely to yield sufficient data to further assess the merits 
of their continued application. For instance, the multiple exploratory fisheries 
in Divisions 58.4 and 48.6 have produced limited information on the status of 
the stock, despite having operated for a number of years. This position begs a 
somewhat more existential question of the regime for new and exploratory 
fisheries: should such programmes remain open in virtual perpetuity, despite 
routinely generating modest results? Such an approach potentially under-
mines the precautionary nature of this framework, serving to facilitate con-
tinued fishing with little prospect of reliably confirming its environmental 
feasibility. Indeed, the Members have long recognised that where extended 
periods of exploratory fishing continue without the requisite assessments 
being possible, ‘some of these fisheries are de facto commercial fisheries’,121 
118   CCAMLR-XXX (n 79), para 12.53.
119   AFMA (n 92) at pp. 7–8.
120   For instance, given an initially high level of participation in in Division 58.4.4, New 
Zealand withdrew its notification ‘in the spirit of ’ the preamble of (then) CM 65/XII: 
CCAMLR-XX (n 106), para 7.9.
121   CCAMLR Symposium, 5–8 April 2005, Universidad Austral de Chile, Valdivia; Volume 1: 
Report of the Chairs, 6 (available online at http://www.antarctica.gov.au/law-and-treaty/
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an outcome that the system was expressly developed to avoid. Thus far CCAMLR 
has resisted imposing temporal limits on the operation of exploratory fisheries, 
an option that is available in principle to other regulators.122 As this shortfall is 
not attributable to obvious misconduct within the fishery, CCAMLR has taken 
a more pragmatic view of the situation, seemingly considering that the intrin-
sic value of generating some data currently outweighs the regulatory merits of 
closing particular areas and thereby receiving none. Moreover, it is recognised 
that intended fishing activities in a challenging environment are not always 
feasible in any given season and that valuable data may also be compromised 
by extrinsic factors beyond the control of the fishers.123
One approach towards addressing the significant variability experienced 
between such programmes has been to introduce separate nomenclature – 
and, prospectively, distinct expectations – for particular exploratory fisher-
ies. In 2010 an additional sub-category of ‘Data-Poor Exploratory Fisheries’ 
was identified by the Scientific Committee to denote ‘all those fisheries that 
are closed or exploratory fisheries for which stock assessments are lacking’,124 
with specific reference to Subarea 48.6 and Divisions 58.4.1 and 58.4.2, which 
have consistently yielded limited data despite having been operational for a 
considerable period of time. Problems in obtaining accurate data from these 
fisheries, especially those conducted in Divisions 58.4.1 and 58.4.2, have been 
compounded by the scale of IUU fishing in these waters, which is ‘huge, often 
surpassing the legal take’.125 This combination of challenges has led to Data-
Poor Exploratory Fisheries being recently considered in a degree of isolation 
to other exploratory fisheries within CCAMLR, even if their qualifying feature 
– a lack of sufficient information to facilitate more orthodox regulation – is 
ccamlr/symposium-in-chile-2005), at which a mooted five-year limit for individual ex-
ploratory fisheries failed to find favour within CCAMLR.
122   For instance, SPRFMO contemplates a ten-year limit for exploratory fisheries – although, 
as noted below, practice is insufficient to determine whether this will be stringently ap-
plied and this body has to date largely elaborated its policies towards such activities based 
on the CCAMLR model.
123   Indeed, in one memorable instance extensive catch data from exploratory longlining 
were consumed by an opportunistic pod of orcas: Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the 
Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXX), para 3.123.
124   Report of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-XXIX), para 
3.126. This appears to have been a term of art to distinguish the exploratory fisheries of the 
Ross Sea, which were considered by that point to have met the data-collection require-
ments of CM 21-02, from other exploratory fisheries in the CCAMLR Area: ibid., para 3.127.
125   DG Ainley and D Pauly, ‘Fishing Down the Food Web of the Antarctic Continental Shelf 
and Slope’ (2014) 50(1) Polar Record 92–107, at p. 96.
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essentially indistinguishable from that of any other such fishery, which is in-
herently characterised by a paucity of data. Further discussions have duly oc-
curred within CCAMLR as to whether alternative research programmes are 
appropriate for such fisheries, although particular delegations have opposed 
a softening of standards on the basis that the problem lies rather more in the 
implementation of these requirements than in their formulation.126
Conceptual challenges to this approach aside, the sub-classification of ex-
ploratory fishing is indicative of a further – and essentially self-inflicted – malaise 
concerning the regulation of more specialised fishing regimes. In recent years, 
categories of non-commercial fishing have steadily proliferated, blurring the 
boundaries between forms of research-oriented activities. The additional com-
plications raised by this approach are clearly reflected in recent developments 
in exploratory fishing under CCAMLR.127 In this regard, a significant volume 
of research fishing has been sanctioned in numerous closed areas, pursuant 
to CM 24-01, including extensive toothfish fisheries, which appear exploratory 
in all but name, yet are subject to more limited oversight within CCAMLR in 
comparison to the seven ‘official’ exploratory fisheries.128 Likewise, a distinct 
regime is envisaged for ‘research fishing’ that may be prospectively conducted 
in newly exposed marine areas, an activity that would also share the funda-
mental features of exploratory fishing,129 if not its nomenclature.
This broad trend further illustrates the increasing need to (re-)establish 
clearer definitional boundaries between research fishing regimes, for which 
126   CCAMLR-XXX (n 79), para 11.11; this view has been expressed most forcefully by the 
Australian delegation, which has considered any distinction between individual explor-
atory fisheries to be fundamentally ‘misleading’, a view that it has strongly reiterated: 
CCAMLR-XXXIV (n 115), para 9.13.
127   Indeed, the Scientific Committee briefly mooted the amalgamation of the stages of ‘new’ 
and ‘exploratory’ fishing in 2008, so that exploratory fishing would be simply extended 
to incorporate the first year of operation, as the rather more specific data-collection re-
quirements of CM 21-02 could potentially provide a greater volume of information more 
swiftly: Report of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR-
XXVII), para 4.186. This did not come to fruition and the distinction between the two 
categories of fishing remains intact.
128   Review of the CCAMLR Regulatory Framework and Recommendations for Streamlining 
Fishery Status; Document CCAMLR-XXXIV/17 Rev.1, 6–7.
129   See CM 24-04, paras 7, 8, 12 and 14, adopted at the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the CCAMLR 
Commission in October 2016. Future research fishing in these areas under CM 24-04 will 
be seemingly conducted on a similar basis to new and exploratory fishing under CCAMLR, 
including requirements for full observer coverage, prior approval and the development of 
a research plan.
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the likely remedy will be a complex exercise in mapping the methodologi-
cal distinctions between the various forms of non-commercial operations, 
or re-casting current research fishing more formally within the regime of ex-
ploratory fishing. Such a move is not without complications or conflict, how-
ever, with some CCAMLR Members reluctant to re-categorise closed fisheries 
as exploratory unless the stock status has changed in a manner that would 
render exploratory fishing sustainable, or unless this re-classification would 
provide a clearer basis to assess the stock in question.130 Nor indeed is the po-
tential coagulation of sundry categories of non-commercial fishing unique to 
CCAMLR: the SPRFMO Convention, for instance, contemplates the conduct of 
‘research or exploratory fishing’.131 Likewise, as observed below, the notion of 
‘non-commercial fishing’ has introduced further complexity to the ongoing 
‘Broader Process’ on the international regulation of high seas fishing in the 
central Arctic Ocean.
 Towards a Transition to Managed Stocks? The Ross Sea Exploratory 
Fishery
A question of key importance to the regulation of new and exploratory fish-
eries remains the conditions under which such activities may be eventually 
reformulated as commercial fisheries. Thus far, this process has yet to be for-
mally concluded in relation to the various exploratory fisheries established 
under the auspices of CCAMLR. However, the toothfish fishery in Divisions 88.1 
and 88.2 (the ‘Ross Sea Exploratory Fishery’132) has approached this transition 
point, with the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment (WG-FSA) having 
recommended that its present classification as an exploratory fishery be sub-
stituted for that of an established fishery. The process by which this stage has 
been reached under CCAMLR therefore represents the clearest current insight 
into how a transition might be managed, both within and beyond the Southern 
Ocean.
New fisheries within the Ross Sea area in Divisions 88.1 and 88.2 were first 
notified in 1997, primarily for Antarctic toothfish. In contrast to other ex-
ploratory fisheries outlined above, by 2001 it was observed that catches and 
130   As was, for instance, the clear viewpoint of the USA: ibid., para 9.15.
131   Article 22(2); emphasis added.
132   Specific management measures for exploratory fisheries in the Ross Sea are addressed 
through CMs 41-09 and 41-10. These fisheries have tended to be treated holistically by 
CCAMLR as the ‘Ross Sea exploratory toothfish fishery’, although consensus has not been 
reached on amalgamating the governance of all such initiatives within Divisions 88.1 and 
88.2 into a single CM: CCAMLR-XXXII (n 110), para 5.34.
37The International Regulation of New and Exploratory Fisheries
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33 (2018) 1–62
participation in this region were significantly more buoyant, albeit at levels 
some considerable margin below the set limits.133 This attracted a steady in-
flux of additional notifications and, by 2004, the Commission observed with 
concern that the Division 88.1 exploratory fishery ‘now had the largest number 
of vessels fishing in any of the CCAMLR statistical areas’.134 Nevertheless, this 
increase in participation also meant that by 2005 the necessary geographical 
spread of fishing had been achieved and the requirement to conduct specific 
research sets under CM 41-01 could be lifted for these Divisions.135
By 2010, the WG-FSA considered that these exploratory fisheries had formal-
ly met the data-collection requirements of CM 21-02 and the research and as-
sessment work undertaken in these areas had enabled it to effectively evaluate 
the distribution, abundance and demography of the target species, allowing 
for reliable projections of the potential impact of regular fishing at clearly de-
fined levels upon dependant and related species.136 Accordingly, the following 
year, the WG-FSA tabled a formal document advocating the Ross Sea fishery be 
re-categorised as an established fishery.137 However, the Scientific Committee 
stopped short of recommending this outcome to the Commission, considering 
that the various CMs applicable to these exploratory fisheries had engendered 
a framework for research, assessment and data collection ‘which had been es-
sential for reaching this status and whose retention would be essential in the 
future’.138 Formal endorsement of a transition to commercial management has 
thus been postponed, pending further advice from the WG-FSA concerning 
the methodologies for ensuring that such data continue to be collated and as-
sessed under more commercialised fishing conditions. Nevertheless, the status 
of this fishery has been further complicated by the designation of an extensive 
marine protected area for the Ross Sea region, effective from December 2017. 
133   CCAMLR-XX (n 106), para 7.2. As Ainley and Pauly observe, fishers within this particu-
lar area swiftly perfected the techniques for catching toothfish in these waters, which 
may further explain the discrepancy in yields between CCAMLR’s exploratory fisheries: 
(n 125) 95.
134   Report of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXIII), para 9.12.
135   SC-CCAMLR-XXIV (n 60), paras 4.135–4.136.
136   SC-CCAMLR-XXIX (n 124), para 3.129. On the role of exploratory fishing in mapping the 
ecological characteristics of Antarctic toothfish in this region see S Hanchet, A Dunn, 
S Parker, P Horn, D Stevens and S Mormede,‘The Antarctic Toothfish (Dissostichus maw-
soni): Biology, Ecology, and Life History in the Ross Sea Region’ (2015) 761(1) Hydrobiologia 
397–414, at pp. 398–412.
137   The Ross Sea Toothfish Fishery: Proposal of Conditional Transition of Classification from 
Exploratory to Established; Document WG-FSA-11/32.
138   SC-CCAMLR-XXX (n 123), para 3.179.
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Under these arrangements, current fishing activities are scheduled to continue 
in these waters pursuant to CMs 41-09 and 41-10, alongside the emerging be-
spoke management regime for this area,139 which may ultimately inhibit the 
envisaged future transition to commercial management of these exploratory 
fisheries.
Notwithstanding the evolving arrangements for the Ross Sea fishery in 
general, concerns have been raised that a proposed transition process may be 
somewhat premature. Although the data-collection requirements stipulated 
by CM 21-02 are deemed to have been met, substantial gaps nevertheless re-
main in the knowledge base concerning toothfish in this region. For instance, 
information as to the full-year life-cycle of toothfish is incomplete, given that 
exploratory fishing activities occur within a seasonally limited window of time 
each year and there is little scope to obtain fisheries-independent data for this 
species.140
Critics of the current regime have argued that these arrangements are insuf-
ficiently nuanced to facilitate the effective implementation of the precaution-
ary approach, citing an inadequate ecosystem monitoring programme within 
these fisheries and questioning whether the framework has been applied in 
a genuinely adaptive manner, given that the data generated thus far have re-
sulted in little alteration to the annual quota.141 This has led to calls to curtail 
fishing effort within the Ross Sea exploratory fishery142 and even for a morato-
rium on further activities.143 These misgivings have been trenchantly rejected 
139   CM 91-05 (2016): Ross Sea Region Marine Protected Area, para 28. Further requirements 
for fishing within the Special Research Zone of the Area, which includes exploratory fish-
ing covered under CM 41-09, will enter into effect in 2020.
140   Hanchet et al. (n 136) at p. 411. There are also limited data on the importance of toothfish 
as a prey species to top predators within the Antarctic ecosystem: MH Pinkerton and 
JM Bradford-Grieve, ‘Characterizing Foodweb Structure to Identify Potential Ecosystem 
Effects of Fishing in the Ross Sea, Antarctica’ (2014) 71(7) ICES Journal of Marine Science 
1542–1553, at p. 1550.
141   PA Abrams, DG Ainley, LK Blight, PK Dayton, JT Eastman and JL Jacquet, ‘Necessary 
Elements of Precautionary Management: Implications for the Antarctic Toothfish’ (2016) 
17(4) Fish and Fisheries 1152–1174, at pp. 1156–1159; see also PA Abrams, ‘How Precautionary 
is the Policy Governing the Ross Sea Antarctic Toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni) Fishery?’ 
(2014) 26(1) Antarctic Science 3–14.
142   Abrams et al. (n 141) at p. 1170.
143   LK Blight, DG Ainley, SF Ackley, G Ballard, T Ballerini, RL Brownell Jr., C-HC Cheng, 
M Chiantore, D Costa, MC Coulter, P Dayton, AL Devries, R Dunbar, S Earle, JT Eastman, 
SD Emslie, CW Evans, RA Garrott, S Kim, G Kooyman, A Lescroël, M Lizotte, M Massaro, 
S Olmastroni, PJ Ponganis, J Russell, DB Siniff, WO Smith Jr., BS Stewart, I Stirling, 
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by members of the CCAMLR Scientific Committee, who have asserted that the 
Ross Sea arrangements represent ‘best practice for precautionary management 
of developing fisheries in an ecosystem context’ and have justified the meth-
odologies employed as having allowed the fishery to develop ‘in a steady and 
orderly fashion… whilst maintaining the catch levels commensurate with the 
data and knowledge available at the time’.144
Viewed as a unique test case of the implementation of regulatory require-
ments for exploratory fishing, it appears from the Ross Sea context that, if such 
activities were re-classified as commercial enterprises, a degree of transitional 
management is likely to occur and further research and data collection obliga-
tions would still be incumbent upon participants, at least in the short-term. 
In this manner, CCAMLR recognises that newly managed fisheries ought to be 
regulated more strictly in comparison to pre-existing fisheries as a core com-
ponent of its application of the precautionary approach. It may be speculated 
that the imposition of ongoing research requirements embodies a regulatory 
compromise inherent in balancing the lack of scientific certainty derived from 
exploratory fisheries against the fulfilment of the specified terms of CM 21-02. 
Nevertheless, the practical mechanics of any post-exploratory management 
system have yet to be finalised by the WG-FSA and endorsed by the Scientific 
Committee. Accordingly, for the foreseeable future the management of the 
Ross Sea exploratory toothfish fishery will continue under the direction of CMs 
41-09 and 41-10. In the meantime, however, it may be observed that this particu-
lar exploratory fishery has in recent seasons operated as a de facto commercial 
enterprise, exhibiting problems familiar to many other global fisheries: notably 
increasing capacity, combined with the steady migration of vessels between 
fishing opportunities as exploratory management areas have been successively 
closed due to the available catch limits being rapidly met or exceeded.145
J Willis, P Wilson and EJ Woehler,‘Fishing for Data in the Ross Sea’ (2010) 330 Science 1316, at 
p. 1316.
144   S Hanchet, K Sainsbury, D Butterworth and C Darby, ‘CCAMLR’s Precautionary Approach 
to Management Focusing on Ross Sea Toothfish Fishery’ (2015) 27(4) Antarctic Science 
333–340, at p. 340.
145   On overcapacity see Report of the Thirty-First Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-
XXXI), para 5.25; on current fishing and vessel practices see Report of the Thirty-Third 
Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXXIII), paras 5.33–5.36.
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 Emerging Regimes for New and Exploratory Fishing
Beyond the auspices of CCAMLR, specific regulatory powers over new and 
exploratory fishing have been conferred upon a growing number of RFMOs, 
notably those instituted following the adoption of the UNFSA. Thus far, how-
ever, these mandates have been generally exercised in a limited manner. As 
a notable exception, SPRFMO has established a comprehensive framework 
for new and exploratory fisheries based largely upon the model pioneered 
by CCAMLR, with which it shares a regulatory boundary, a number of mutual 
parties and, prospectively, a series of overlapping fish stocks. Originating from 
trilateral negotiations in 2006 between Australia, Chile and New Zealand to ad-
dress fisheries resources in the South Pacific region, the SPRFMO Convention 
was concluded in 2009 and entered into force in August 2012. Despite having 
only been in effect for a relatively brief period of time, SPRFMO has swiftly 
emerged as one of the more far-sighted fisheries bodies presently in opera-
tion. Indeed, at a preliminary stage in the negotiations it was determined that 
SPRFMO would transcend the basic principles of the UNFSA, which was seen 
as a useful regulatory template but representative only of minimum require-
ments for fisheries management.146 The resulting formulation of the SPRFMO 
Convention has been duly lauded as having ‘raised the legal standard for inter-
national fisheries management’ for, inter alia, new and exploratory fisheries.147
Reflecting this proactive regulatory philosophy, the SPRFMO Convention 
has advanced the most extensive framework for new and exploratory fisheries 
of the current post-UNFSA RFMOs. To this end, Article 22(1) provides that:
[a] fishery that has not been subject to fishing or has not been subject 
to fishing with a particular gear type or technique for ten years or more 
shall be opened as a fishery or opened to fishing with such gear type or 
technique only when the Commission has adopted cautious preliminary 
conservation and management measures in respect of that fishery, and, 
as appropriate, non-target and associated or dependent species, and ap-
propriate measures to protect the marine ecosystem in which that fishery 
occurs from adverse impacts of fishing activities.
146   Y Takei, Filling Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fishing: Discrete Stocks, Deep-Sea Fisheries 
and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2013) at pp. 210–211.
147   Report of the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relat-
ing to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks; Document A/CONF/210/2010/7, para 37.
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Echoing key components of the CCAMLR approach, the SPRFMO Convention 
further considers that appropriate conservation and management measures 
(CMMs) will include prior notification, observer coverage, the submission of a 
development plan, data-collection requirements and mitigation measures to 
prevent adverse impacts upon marine ecosystems,148 and also facilitating the 
adoption of specific CMMs to advance the precautionary regulation of new 
and exploratory fisheries. In keeping with the broad conditions of Article 6(6) 
of the UNFSA, such measures
shall ensure that the new fishing resource is developed on a precaution-
ary and gradual basis until sufficient information is acquired to enable 
the Commission to adopt appropriately detailed conservation and man-
agement measures.149
Despite the comprehensive formulation of Article 22, the SPRFMO Convention 
nonetheless retains some scope for future interpretive difficulties, not least 
concerning the notion of a ‘fishery’. Although the SPRFMO Convention ad-
vances extensive definitions of ‘fisheries resources’, ‘fishing’ and ‘fishing 
vessels’,150 the preceding negotiations revealed conflicting perspectives on 
the legal status of previously unfished stocks. Indeed, whereas some del-
egations sought to expressly integrate such resources within the regime of 
Article 22, others considered that a ‘target fishery’ would be established where 
some effort had been applied to a particular species anywhere within the 
SPRFMO Area, irrespective of the absence of prior fishing activities within a 
specific location. This latter interpretation would appear to be out of kilter with 
the broad spirit of Article 6(6) of the UNFSA – and prevailing CCAMLR practice – 
yet in principle remains an open question, as the concept of a target fishery 
failed to graduate into the final wording of the Convention and the term ‘fish-
ery’ accordingly remains undefined.151
These divergent negotiating positions notwithstanding, few interpre-
tive complications have ultimately afflicted the limited SPRFMO practice to 
date. Nevertheless, in 2015 the SPRFMO Scientific Committee observed that, 
despite the general terms of Article 22, the ‘Convention and existing CMMs 
and standards provided little guidance for the development and approval of 
148   Article 22(2).
149   Ibid. Similarly, under Article 3(2)(a), the precautionary approach ‘as described in’ the 
UNFSA and Code of Conduct is to be applied in the SPRFMO Convention Area.
150   Article 1(1)(f), (g) and (h).
151   See further Takei (n 146) at p. 219.
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exploratory fishing proposals’.152 These concerns, coupled with the first formal 
application to undertake exploratory fishing in the SPRFMO Area, resulted in 
the adoption in 2016 of two distinct CMMs to further advance the practical 
requirements for such activities.
To this end, CMM 4.13 (Exploratory Fisheries; 2016) expands and modifies 
the scope and application of Article 22, with such activities collectively consid-
ered ‘exploratory fisheries’.153 As with the CCAMLR regime, CMM 4.13 mandates 
the prior submission and approval of a Fisheries Operation Plan, from which 
the Scientific Committee will establish a Data Collection Plan outlining the 
research requirements incumbent on fishers. Unlike the CCAMLR approach, 
however, SPRFMO prospectively adopts a stronger stance against a failure to 
submit the requisite data, with Members and Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties to be prohibited from participating in future exploratory fishing until 
full information from previous activities has been provided to the Commission.154 
This reinforces the ethos that participation in exploratory fisheries remains a 
privilege rather than an entitlement in these waters: as noted above, CMM 4.13 
adopts a similarly restrictive position to CCAMLR in managing the expecta-
tions of ‘pioneer’ fishers, for which Article 21(1)(i) of the SPRFMO Convention 
will be seemingly interpreted in a negative fashion to punish infractions by 
curtailing future fishing opportunities, rather than actively promoting the pur-
suit of additional fisheries.155
Significantly, CMM 4.13 also elaborates conditions for the future transition of 
exploratory activities to established fisheries. In this regard, the Commission 
may approve an application to manage an exploratory fishery as an established 
fishery where it is satisfied that sufficient information is available to: evaluate 
the distribution, abundance and demography of the target species to inform 
an estimate of the fishery’s potential yield; review the impact of the explorato-
ry fishery upon non-target, associated or dependant species and the accompa-
nying ecosystem; and allow the Scientific Committee to formulate appropriate 
management arrangements.156 In contrast to CCAMLR’s enduring collection of 
152   Report of the Third Scientific Committee Meeting at p. 10.
153   Para 2.
154   Para 17.
155   See n 95 et seq. The Scientific Committee has also emphasized that, irrespective of ex-
emplary conduct, exploratory fishing offers no guarantee that such activities will be 
approved in the future, or that the fleet in question will attain any operative advantage 
should the fishery ultimately transition to commercial management: Report of the Third 
Scientific Committee Meeting (n 152) at p. 10.
156   Para 24.
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‘Data-Poor Exploratory Fisheries’, CMM 4.13 seemingly contemplates a ten-year 
limit on the operation of any SPRFMO exploratory fishery, at which point the 
fishery will be either closed or reconstituted as an established fishery.157 The 
controversy surrounding the intended commercialisation of CCAMLR’s Ross 
Sea Exploratory Fishery nevertheless suggests that some additional flexibility 
may be required in interpreting these deadlines, unless sufficient quantities of 
pertinent data can be yielded in a relatively truncated timeframe. With CMM 
4.13 due to be reviewed in 2019, it is unclear whether SPRFMO will ultimately 
adopt the more permissive approach of CCAMLR towards the lifespan of ex-
ploratory fisheries – an outcome that could in principle be facilitated under 
this provision158 – or, indeed, whether a further ten-year period must elapse 
following closure in order for a fishery to be re-categorised as exploratory 
under Article 22(1) and for this regulatory cycle to commence anew.
Thus far, exploratory fishing within the SPRFMO Area remains in its com-
parative infancy, and applicable policies have generally mirrored those of 
CCAMLR in substance and scope. In 2015 New Zealand applied for a modest 
exploratory catch of toothfish, a species that had not been fished for over ten 
years in these waters, thus triggering the application of Article 22 for the first 
time. Given that no specific procedure had been elaborated for proposed ex-
ploratory fishing at the material time – and with longstanding experience of 
pursuing such activities in the Southern Ocean – the documentation submit-
ted by New Zealand largely followed the CCAMLR template, which was ap-
plauded by the SPRFMO Scientific Committee as ‘a systematic and controlled 
approach to exploratory fishing’.159 This de facto alignment with the documen-
tary requirements of CCAMLR offers significant practical benefits, given that 
the SPRFMO exploratory fishery essentially represents an extension of cur-
rent activities conducted by New Zealand in an adjacent sector of the CAMLR 
Convention Area. Moreover, an additional CMM governing these specific ac-
tivities observed that, due to the likelihood of shared stocks between the two 
bodies, the conduct of exploratory toothfish fishing should follow pertinent 
CCAMLR rules.160
157   Para 23.
158   Para 4(c) considers a fishery to be ‘exploratory’ if it has been undertaken within the previ-
ous ten years pursuant to CMM 4.13 and a decision has yet to be taken by SPRFMO as to its 
status.
159   Report of the Third Scientific Committee Meeting (n 152) at p. 9. The CCAMLR model proved 
a useful template, alongside the specific SPRFMO documentation concerning bottom 
fishing discussed below.
160   CMM 4.14 (Exploratory Toothfish Fishing; 2016), para 16.
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The first SPRFMO exploratory fishery, opened in 2016, has therefore utilised 
standard CCAMLR mitigation measures, observation policies and administra-
tive processes, with this regulatory cross-pollination ‘meeting or exceeding 
SPRFMO requirements’.161 Although a full evaluation of SPRFMO practice re-
mains somewhat premature – restricted thus far to one limited expedition, 
conducted by personnel well versed in the CCAMLR requirements and yielding 
as yet unquantified but ‘[s]ignificant information’162 – there are at least prom-
ising indicators of future regulatory success, drawing upon the hard-learned 
best practices of CCAMLR and advancing strong commitments to sharing data 
to ensure a clearer understanding of the cumulative impacts of exploratory 
fishing across neighbouring RFMOs.163
A limited degree of exploratory fishing for toothfish has also commenced 
under the auspices of SEAFO. Unlike SPRFMO, the SEAFO Convention does 
not advance a specific provision on such activities, notwithstanding overarch-
ing commitments to apply the precautionary approach ‘widely’164 and to take 
account of the principles of Article 6(6) of the UNFSA in determining future 
participatory rights.165 Exploratory fisheries were subsequently defined by the 
SEAFO Scientific Committee in 2014 as ‘fishing experiments solely or primarily 
aimed to discover new resources or new fishing grounds and are as such from 
the outset motivated by commercial interest’,166 a comparatively idiosyncratic 
formulation motivated primarily by a desire to clarify the concept of ‘fisher-
ies research’. This definition nonetheless presents scope for conflict with other 
more established constructions, especially as exploratory fishing under SEAFO 
is expressly distinguished from research fishing – whose main objective is to 
‘create a firm basis for fisheries management advice’ – and is instead deemed 
‘less rigorous… which may typically not have to fully satisfy scientific best prac-
tice standards’, with accompanying data-collection requirements ‘rather a re-
quired by-product than a primary objective of the exploratory fishing effort’.167
161   Report of the Fourth Scientific Committee Meeting at p. 11.
162   Ibid.
163   CMM 4.14 mandates sharing this information with CCAMLR, a requirement first advo-
cated by New Zealand in its initial application to conduct these activities. In 2015 an 
Agreement was adopted between SPRFMO and CCAMLR on future cooperation, includ-
ing data exchange, which is clearly exemplified by current arrangements for exploratory 
fishing.
164   Article 7(1).
165   Article 20(1)(f).
166   Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee to SEAFO, para 23.1.
167   Ibid.
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This divergent approach sits uneasily alongside the neighbouring CCAMLR 
and SPRFMO regimes, which maintain a strong commitment towards targeted 
research objectives for exploratory fishing, as well as Article 6(6) of the UNFSA, 
which clearly mandates the assiduous collection of sufficient ecosystem-
driven data before the commercialisation of a fishery may be contemplated. 
Likewise, there is little indication as to when a fishery or resource may be con-
sidered to be ‘new’, or whether the use of alternative gear in established fisher-
ies might also trigger these requirements. The current concept of exploratory 
fishing under SEAFO is accordingly likely to require future modification to 
more centrally recognise the primary purpose of such activities – i.e., to cau-
tiously ascertain the environmental, rather than the economic, feasibility of 
prospective fishing – as reflected under the UNFSA and current regional mod-
els of best practice.
Elsewhere, the regulation of new and exploratory fishing remains essentially 
prospective in nature. Among the other post-UNFSA RFMOs, regulatory powers 
over such activities have been conferred upon the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Committee (WCPFC) – the constituent treaty of which reproduces 
Article 6(6) practically verbatim168 but has not yet exercised this mandate – 
the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC),169 which entered into effect 
in mid-2015, and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA),170 
which became operational in 2012, with exploratory activities limited thus 
168   Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Honolulu, 5 September 2000, in force 19 June 2004) 
2275 UNTS 43; Article 6(5).
169   Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources 
in the North Pacific Ocean (Seoul, 1 April 2012, in force 19 July 2015; available online at 
http://npfc.r-cms.jp/About_Convention/). Under Article 7(3)(d) the Commission may 
‘establish the terms and conditions for any experimental, scientific, and exploratory 
fishing activities in the Convention Area’, while Article 3(h) obliges participants to en-
sure ‘that any expansion of fishing effort, development of new or exploratory fisheries, 
or change in the gear used for existing fisheries, does not proceed without prior assess-
ment of the impacts of those fishing activities on the long-term sustainability of fisheries 
resources and a determination that those activities would not have significant adverse 
impacts on vulnerable marine ecosystems, or ensuring that those activities are managed 
to prevent those impacts or are not authorized to proceed’.
170   Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (Rome, 7 July 2006, in force 21 June 2012) 
2835 UNTS 1. Article 6(3)(b) empowers the parties to ‘allocate catch quantities for explora-
tion and scientific research’, while under Article 6(2) participation in fisheries should be 
determined in line with ‘inter alia, international principles such as those contained in the 
1995 [UN Fish Stocks] Agreement’.
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far to domestic permits granted to three Korean vessels for the 2012/13 fishing 
season.171
Meanwhile, an express mandate for the supervision of ‘experimental or ex-
ploratory fishing activities’ has been ‘retro-fitted’ into the NAFO Convention, 
through a series of extensive textual revisions adopted in 2007 in order to pro-
mote an ecosystem approach to fisheries management, which eventually en-
tered into effect on 18 May 2017.172 Notwithstanding the recent formalisation 
of these arrangements, NAFO has exhibited a clear regulatory intent towards 
emerging fisheries for a considerable period of time, first recognising the need 
to ‘define and adopt precautionary strategies for the reopening of fisheries and 
for new and developing fisheries’173 in 1999. Moreover, throughout this interim 
period, many of these obligations had been applied provisionally,174 which has 
enabled NAFO to adopt a series of measures to regulate exploratory fisheries 
in the specific context of the protection of VMEs, as discussed further below.
Most recently, the multilateral regulation of new and exploratory fishing has 
been contemplated within the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean, 
an area currently devoid of commercial fishing but for which a substantial in-
flux of valuable stocks has been projected in future decades.175 Although con-
siderable scepticism remains as to whether the Arctic region will ultimately 
be transformed into an area of significant fisheries activity even within the 
long-term future, there has been considerable political interest in pre-emptive 
regulation to ensure that any prospective fishing is undertaken in a precaution-
ary and environmentally sensitive manner. In July 2015, the five central Arctic 
Ocean coastal states adopted a Declaration Concerning the Prevention of 
Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean,176 recognising that 
171   Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries 
Agreement at p. 59.
172   Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries (Ottawa, 24 October 1978, 
in force 1 January 1979) 1135 UNTS 369 (Article I(h)). The consolidated version of this in-
strument, incorporating the 2017 amendments, is available online at https://www.nafo 
.int/Portals/0/PDFs/key-publications/NAFOConvention-2017.pdf.
173   Resolution 2/99 of 17 September 1999 to Guide Implementation of the Precautionary 
Approach within NAFO.
174   Indeed, the 2007 amendments were expressly intended to be applied ‘in accordance with 
Article 6 of the 1995 [UN Fish Stocks] Agreement’: Resolution 1/08 of 26 September 2008 
on the Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
175   See Wisz et al. (n 10) at p. 262 and Lam et al. (n 10) at pp. 348–349.
176   Available online at https://www.regjeringen.no/…/ud/…/declaration-on-arctic-fishe 
ries-16-july-2015.pdf (the ‘Oslo Declaration’). For an extensive overview of this process 
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although commercial fishing in these waters remains a distant and uncertain 
prospect, international obligations to cooperate in the conservation and man-
agement of marine living resources and to apply the precautionary approach 
necessitate the development of interim measures to deter unregulated fishing. 
To this end, the signatories pledged to ensure that ‘any non-commercial fishing 
in this area does not undermine the purpose of the interim measures, is based 
on scientific advice and is monitored, and that data obtained through any such 
fishing is shared’.
The concept of ‘non-commercial fishing’ is not elaborated further in the 
Oslo Declaration, but appears most realistically confined to future exploratory 
and research activities. Indeed, this approach is reflective of policies pursued 
in areas within the national jurisdiction of particular signatories: commercial 
fishing has been precluded in US Arctic waters since 2009, subject to an au-
thorisation procedure requiring ‘a fishery development analysis to ensure the 
best available science is used to move a species from unfished status to full 
fishery development’,177 as well as the Canadian portion of the Beaufort Sea 
see EJ Molenaar, ‘International Regulation of Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries’ in 
MH Nordquist, JM Moore and R Long (eds), Challenges of the Changing Arctic: Continental 
Shelf, Navigation, and Fisheries (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2016) 429–463, at pp. 448–457. The 
Oslo Declaration further stipulates that any commercial fishing shall be conducted solely 
under the auspices of ‘one or more regional or subregional fisheries management orga-
nizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing in ac-
cordance with recognized international standards’. This raises the intriguing question as 
to whether the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, which manages shared 
and straddling stocks within the Barents Sea, qualifies as such and may therefore have 
a potential regulatory mandate with regard to, inter alia, new and exploratory fisher-
ies within these waters. On the modern status of the Commission see I Dahl, ‘Maritime 
Delimitation in the Arctic: Implications for Fisheries Jurisdiction and Cooperation in 
the Barents Sea’ (2015) 30(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 120–157, at 
pp. 132–137 (suggesting that the Commission may meet the criteria enunciated by the 
UNFSA for an RFMa, if not necessarily that for an RFMO).
177   Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area (available on-
line at http://www.npfmc.org/arctic-fishery-management/) at p. 6. This process shares 
elements of the CCAMLR data-collection regime, although it does not expressly utilize 
the procedures or terminology associated with new and exploratory fishing. These devel-
opments were contentious, however, because they also applied to the disputed segment 
of the Beaufort Sea between the US and Canada. Furthermore, the Canadian authorities 
viewed closure as being only one means of addressing sustainability risks, criticizing the 
decision not to consider, inter alia, exploratory fishing protocols for these waters: see fur-
ther M Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2013) at pp. 180–181.
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since 2011, wherein a limited degree of exploratory fishing had previously oc-
curred.178 In both instances, the national authorities envisage a precaution-
ary approach to assess the status of potential target stocks and the ecosystem 
implications of future fisheries, prior to the contemplation of any prospective 
commercial fishing in these waters.179
Subsequent developments within the framework for a ‘stepwise’ approach as 
part of a ‘Broader Process’ towards the potential establishment of a new RFMO 
have involved extensive deliberations on the scope for ‘non-commercial’ fish-
ing, with the initial signatories to the Oslo Declaration having been joined by 
China, Korea, Japan, Iceland and the EU in these negotiations. The European 
Parliament, for instance, has strongly advocated a precautionary approach to 
Arctic fisheries, repeatedly calling for a mechanism to generate reliable infor-
mation concerning fish stocks and marine ecosystems prior to the contempla-
tion of any expansion in fishing effort in a manner broadly analogous to the 
requirements of Article 6(6) of the UNFSA.180 Moreover, the Oslo Declaration 
expressly states that any eventual commercial fishing will be conducted ‘in ac-
cordance with recognised international standards’. Although this term is also 
undefined in the text, it may be considered to have particular significance in 
178   B Ayles, L Porta and RM Clarke, ‘Development of an Integrated Fisheries Co-Management 
Framework for New and Emerging Commercial Fisheries in the Canadian Beaufort Sea’ 
(2016) 72 Marine Policy 246–254, at p. 248.
179   For instance, licenses to fish for new or under-utilized species in Canada are addressed 
under the New Emerging Fisheries Policy, first adopted in 1996. Although weighted 
somewhat towards assessing the commercial viability of future stocks, feasibility and ex-
ploratory fishing licenses also involve limited fishing activities and the collection of eco-
system data. Similarly, in the Alaskan Arctic EEZ, the US authorities have pre-emptively 
prohibited commercial fishing on all species other than Pacific salmon and Pacific hali-
but ‘until sufficient information exists to authorize a sustainable fisheries management 
program’: Fishery Management Plan for Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area 
(n 177) at p. 6. The US has also staunchly opposed the introduction of commercial fisher-
ies in the Arctic region until sufficient information exists to ascertain their impact upon 
stocks and the marine environment: see further R Barnes, ‘International Regulation of 
Fisheries Management in Arctic Waters’ (2011) 54 German Yearbook of International Law 
193–230, at p. 225.
180   See especially European Parliament Resolution of 22 January 2011 on a Sustainable EU 
Policy for the High North, para 22 and European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 
on an EU strategy for the Arctic, para 38. On the current position of the EU in this pro-
cess see N Liu, ‘The European Union’s Potential Contribution to the Governance of High 
Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean’ in N Liu, EA Kirk and T Henriksen (eds), The 
European Union and the Arctic (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2017) 275–295, at pp. 291–294.
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framing regulatory responses to new and exploratory fisheries that are likely to 
emerge within these waters in future years.181
Thus far, the models of best practice advanced under CCAMLR, in tandem 
with the standards for exploratory bottom-fishing outlined below, would ap-
pear to be the most plausible manifestations of current ‘recognised interna-
tional standards’. At the time of writing, full consensus on the oversight of 
exploratory fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean – which had initially proved 
elusive182 – had recently been achieved. To this end, the negotiating parties 
were broadly aligned in considering that such activities should only be con-
ducted pursuant to relevant conservation and management measures ad-
opted by the meetings of the parties of any subsequent management body, 
in a manner similar to the regulation of exploratory fisheries by other RFMOs. 
Nevertheless, in keeping with the prevailing negotiating position that ‘nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed’, the final details of this regime have yet to 
be formally approved. The participants in the ‘Broader Process’ are currently in 
the process of consolidating these points of consensus, with a view to articulat-
ing the final details of this regime in a text to be developed in future months.183
 Exploratory Deep-Sea Fishing and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems 
on the High Seas
As considered above, a general regime governing new and exploratory fisher-
ies has been established under the UNFSA, a position inspired predominantly 
by the regulatory innovations of CCAMLR, and has been subsequently applied 
within a growing number of RFMOs. However, a second and more specific basis 
for the elaboration of overarching standards for such activities has emerged 
comparatively recently in the context of international efforts to protect the 
deep-sea environment from, inter alia, the poorly-controlled expansion of fish-
ing effort. Since the mid-twentieth century, both commercial and exploratory 
181   Molenaar (n 176) at p. 455.
182   Indeed, ‘the manner in which the agreement addresses exploratory fishing’ had been re-
cently identified as an issue requiring further discussion: US Department of State, Chair’s 
Report of the Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 29 November– 
1 December 2016, available online at http://thearcticjournal.com/press-releases/2733/
meeting-high-seas-fisheries-central-arctic-ocean.
183   US Department of State, Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, 
March 27, 2017: Chair’s Report, available online at https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/
rls/269126.htm.
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fisheries have steadily progressed into offshore areas and deeper waters, as 
shallow-water stocks have become increasingly depleted and fishers have been 
accordingly forced to pursue alternative opportunities.184 Consequently, the 
mean depth of global fisheries has expanded four-fold since the mid-1960s,185 
accompanied by a steady proliferation of demersal fishing into areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.
Deep-sea fisheries have traditionally presented considerable regulatory 
challenges. In order to survive at advanced depths, in an environment charac-
terised by cold temperatures, little light and limited productivity, such fishes 
typically exhibit delayed sexual maturity, slow growth and a high maximum 
age. In marked contrast to species exploited at shallower depths, deep-water 
species are thereby acutely vulnerable to the impacts of fishing, since with few 
exceptions such stocks can become rapidly depleted with little scope to regen-
erate swiftly.186 The risks of overfishing are compounded by a lack of baseline 
data concerning both deep-water stocks and their accompanying ecosystems, 
hence most deep-sea fisheries are considered unlikely to be either ecologi-
cally or economically sustainable in the long-term. Moreover, deep-sea fishing 
is considered to be especially destructive in comparison to other operations, 
given the predominant reliance upon the use of bottom-trawling, whereby 
heavily weighted nets are dragged across the seabed, presenting an amplified 
scope for benthic damage in the process.187
Notwithstanding these concerns, until the present century the pursuit of 
new deep-sea fishing opportunities was, in practice, largely unregulated. 
Indeed, by the time at which the UNFSA entered into force, there were sig-
nificant portions of the global oceans – especially high seas areas – for which 
RFMOs had yet to be established, hence there were few pre-existing governance 
184   T Morato, R Watson, TJ Pitcher and D Pauly, ‘Fishing Down The Deep’ (2006) 7(1) Fish and 
Fisheries 24–34, at p. 31.
185   EA Norse, S Brook, WWL Cheung, MR Clark, I Ekelund, R Froese, KM Gjerde, RL Haedrich, 
SS Hepple, T Morato, LE Morgan, D Pauly, R Sumaila and R Watson, ‘Sustainability of 
Deep-Sea Fisheries’ (2012) 36(2) Marine Policy 307–320, at p. 308.
186   Morato et al. (n. 184), at p. 25.
187   Bottom-trawling is an umbrella term for a variety of trawl fisheries, each of which uses gear 
variations that encapsulate weighted features with the capacity to impact both hard- and 
soft-bottom benthic ecosystems; see further JW Valdermansen, T Jørgensen and A Engås, 
Options to Mitigate Bottom Habitat Impact of Dragged Gears (FAO, Rome, 2007), at pp. 5–18. 
Accordingly, bottom fishing is widely understood as constituting any fishery that uses 
gear ‘that either contact or are likely to contact the sea floor during the course of the fish-
ing operation’: A Bensch, M Gianni, D Gréboval, J Sanders and A Hjort, Worldwide Review 
of Bottom Fisheries in the High Seas (FAO, Rome, 2009) at p. 2.
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structures through which deep-sea fisheries might be addressed. Moreover, 
within the network of regulatory coverage that did exist, only four such 
bodies188 were endowed with an express mandate to address deep-sea stocks, 
with many RFMOs having been established to address a single species, notably 
tuna or salmon. Compounding these regulatory lacunae, among the small col-
lective of actors with an explicit remit to govern deep-sea stocks, it was legally 
questionable whether this competence extended beyond the management 
of the target stock to also include oversight of the wider ecosystem impacts 
of such fisheries. Indeed, as Molenaar observes, a strict interpretation of the 
existing mandates of these four bodies at the time would suggest that only 
CCAMLR retained express powers to regulate both deep-sea species and the 
ecosystem impacts of fishing upon them.189 Consequently, for most areas of 
the global oceans, deep-sea fisheries represented ‘one of the last unregulat-
ed open-access frontiers, governed only by the general provisions of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’.190
Since the turn of the present century, however, endeavours to mitigate the 
prospective impacts of deep-sea fisheries – including those of an exploratory 
character – upon benthic ecosystems have been pursued primarily through 
the UNGA. In this regard, the UNGA has provided a convenient platform for the 
development of further standards, thereby overcoming two prominent regula-
tory concerns at the material time, namely the apparent absence of an obvi-
ous and readily identifiable forum for the consideration of deep-sea fisheries 
on the high seas191 and strong divergences of opinion as to whether deep-sea 
fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction should be more appropriately 
188   Namely CCAMLR, NEAFC, NAFO and the General Fisheries Commission for the 
Mediterranean (GFCM).
189   EJ Molenaar, ‘Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries’ (2005) 20(3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 533–570, at p. 538.
190   KM Gjerde and D Freestone, ‘Unfinished Business: Deep-Sea Fisheries and the Conserva-
tion of Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2004) 19(3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 209–222, at p. 209.
191   M Lodge, ‘Improving International Governance in the Deep Sea’ (2004) 19(3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 299–316, at p. 301. For a full accounting of the variety of 
bodies through which efforts were made to promote deep-sea bottom fishing as an issue 
of regulatory concern, commencing in 2000 at the first meeting of the United Nations 
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, see LA Kimball, ‘Deep-
Sea Fisheries of the High Seas: The Management Impasse’ (2004) 19(3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 259–287, at pp. 263–272.
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addressed through binding or non-binding means.192 Accordingly, the political 
impetus of the UNGA has facilitated the subsequent emergence of a clearer 
degree of normative order to these activities, notwithstanding enduring defini-
tional inconsistency between institutions as to the threshold of depth at which 
deep-water fisheries are considered to operate.193
In 2004, the UNGA first called upon states to act individually or through 
RFMOs to consider the prohibition of destructive fishing practices, including 
bottom-fishing, pending the adoption of appropriate ‘conservation and man-
agement measures’.194 A further and highly influential Resolution requested 
states to ‘identify vulnerable marine ecosystems and determine whether bot-
tom fishing activities would cause significant adverse impacts to such eco-
systems and the long-term sustainability of deep sea fish stocks, inter alia, by 
improving scientific research and data collection and sharing, and through 
new and exploratory fisheries’.195 Subsequent Resolutions have reinforced the 
protection of VMEs as a regulatory priority for RFMOs,196 which have been 
designated as the primary actors through which the operative paragraphs of 
Resolution 61/105 and subsequent instruments are to be implemented, along-
side provision for the periodic review of progress under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General.197
192   See further DA Balton and DC Zbicz, ‘Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold 
Questions’ (2004) 19(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 247–258, at 
pp. 252–255.
193   In its global review of the scale and regulation of bottom fishing beyond national jurisdic-
tion, the FAO examined those commencing at depths of over 200 metres, which, although 
not considered ‘as a primary criterion,’ may be considered an influential rule of thumb: 
Bensch, et al. (n 187) at p. 2. Nevertheless, as Oanta observes, the FAO’s position has subse-
quently changed to a definition of 500 metres, while other actors have sought to classify 
particular species as deep-sea fishes, rather than specifying an arbitrary depth (n. 75), at 
pp. 592–593.
194   A/Res/59/25 of 17 November 2004, paras 66–69. This had been preceded in 2002 with a 
more ambiguous call for action by the UNGA ‘to consider urgently ways to integrate and 
improve, on a scientific basis, the management of risks to marine biodiversity of sea-
mounts and certain other underwater features within the framework of the [1982 Law 
of the Sea] Convention’: A/Res/57/141 of 12 December 2002, para 56. Resolution 59/25 
stopped short of instituting a full ban on such gear, which had been advocated by a 
vociferous lobby of states and NGOs: Takei (n 146) at p. 112.
195   A/Res/61/105 of 8 December 2006, para 83(b) (emphasis added).
196   A/Res/64/72 of 4 December 2009, paras 113, 117 and 119–124; A/Res/66/68 of 6 December 
2011, paras 121, 126, 129, 130, 132, 133 and 134; A/Res/71/123 of 7 December 2016, paras 174–182.
197   Resolution 64/72 (para 128) and Resolution 66/68 (para 137).
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In 2009, the FAO adopted the International Guidelines for the Management 
of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas, which were developed to assist RFMOs 
in the implementation of the various commitments established under para-
graphs 76–95 of UNGA Resolution 61/105, which included provision for new and 
exploratory bottom fisheries. The FAO Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines estab-
lished that deep-sea fisheries are to be ‘rigorously managed’ during the experi-
mental, exploratory and established stages of their development.198 Although 
the parameters of these stages were not expressly defined by the FAO, a broadly 
analogous position to Article 6(6) of the UNFSA has been advanced, with states 
encouraged to ensure that ‘conservation and management measures for [deep-
sea fisheries] should ensure that, while knowledge is low, harvest rates are kept 
low enough to minimise risk to sustainability and harvests only increase as 
knowledge, management capacity and [monitoring, control and surveillance] 
increase’.199 Accordingly, RFMOs should elaborate appropriate mechanisms for 
reviewing assessments, determinations and management measures, including 
the receipt of advice from appropriate scientific bodies and the consideration 
of effective mitigation measures.200 Such procedures should also be supported 
by international observer programmes, for which
[h]igher levels of coverage are required, in particular for experimental 
and exploratory stages of a fishery’s development’, especially where such 
fishing takes place outside an RFMO, which should continue ‘until mea-
sures in place to manage these fisheries and prevent significant adverse 
impacts are evaluated and determined to be effective.201
The Guidelines also considered an ‘appropriate set of rules and regulations’ to 
be a core element of a ‘functioning regulatory framework’ for the opening of 
such areas to exploratory fisheries, which should include regulations to protect 
vulnerable populations, communities and habitats.202 Precautionary conser-
vation and management measures, including catch and effort controls, were 
considered ‘essential’ during the exploratory phase of a deep-sea fishery and 
should include measures to manage the impact of the fishery on low-produc-
tivity species, non-target species and sensitive habitat features.203 To this end, 
198   Para 23.
199   Ibid.
200   Para 50.
201   Para 55.
202   Para 61.
203   Para 65.
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the FAO recommended the institution of precautionary effort limits, in the ab-
sence of reliable estimates of sustainable catches of both target and non-target 
species, supported by precautionary measures to prevent serial depletion of 
low productivity stocks. This approach was also to be supported by the regular 
review of stock status and a downwards revision of catch estimates if appropri-
ate, alongside measures to prevent significant adverse impacts on VMEs and 
the comprehensive monitoring of all fishing effort, catch statistics and interac-
tions with VMEs.
In a manner reminiscent of the further implementation of Article 6(6) of 
the UNFSA, the position on VMEs advanced under UNGA Resolution 61/105, in 
conjunction with the FAO Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines, has strongly influ-
enced the formulation of common regulatory standards for deep-sea fishing. 
As intended by the UNGA Resolutions, particular RFMOs have subsequently 
developed clear policies and procedures to regulate exploratory fishing in the 
specific context of the deep-sea environment. In this regard, a broadly uniform 
framework for the management of prospective deep-sea exploratory fishing 
has been adopted by a growing array of RFMOs, maintaining a clear emphasis 
on prior approval and the scientific review of intended exploratory activities, 
alongside targeted data-collection requirements and the graduated expansion 
of fishing effort in a restrained and precautionary manner.
This broad approach is clearly exemplified by the arrangements adopted by 
NEAFC, wherein the proactive management of deep-sea ecosystems dates back 
to 2004.204 In 2008, NEAFC adopted an Interim Exploratory Bottom Fishing 
Protocol for New Bottom Fishing Areas,205 Under these arrangements the 
Commission, in consultation with the International Council on Exploration 
of the Sea (ICES), has mapped the parameters of bottom fishing undertaken 
within the NEAFC Regulatory Area to date, with such areas maintained in an 
Annex to the Recommendation which establishes a definitive, yet adjustable, 
list of existing fishing areas. Exploratory bottom fishing is thus defined as ‘all 
commercial bottom fishing activities outside area closures and existing bot-
tom fishing areas, or if there are significant changes to the conduct and tech-
nology of bottom fishing activities within existing bottom fishing areas’.206
204   At this juncture, the NEAFC parties interpreted the Commission’s competence in a broad 
manner to close a series of deep-sea sites to bottom-trawling: see further Molenaar (n 189) 
at pp. 538–539.
205   Recommendation XVI:2008.
206   Article 2(d), Recommendation 9:2015; see Consolidated Text of all NEAFC Recom-
mendations on Regulating Bottom Fishing, available online at www.neafc.org.
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Any prospective expansion of bottom fishing beyond existing sites is ad-
dressed under Articles 6 and 7 of the NEAFC Bottom Fishing Recommendation, 
which places the onus on the proposing party to gather data to present to the 
Commission. Under Article 6, a Notice of Intent (NoI) must be submitted to 
the Commission at least 6 months prior to the purported fishing activities and, 
in a manner broadly similar to the CCAMLR framework for new and explorato-
ry fisheries, will include a harvesting plan, a mitigation plan and a ‘sufficient 
system’ to record data. NoIs are subject to prior review and approval by the par-
ties and the Permanent Committee on Management and Science (PECMAS), 
with preference to be given to ‘exploratory bottom fishing using fishing gear 
and methods with the least bottom contact, in well-mapped areas and at times 
when impacts are likely to have the least adverse impacts on organisms other 
than the target species’.207 The Commission is to review the reports and may 
decide to authorise bottom fishing in these areas as ‘existing bottom fishing 
areas’ based on the results of exploratory bottom fishing conducted in the pre-
vious two years.208
This process operates in conjunction with Article 7, under which the parties 
must submit a preliminary assessment of known and anticipated impacts of 
the proposed bottom fishing activities, to be conducted in the light of advice 
from ICES or, if none is available, ‘to the best of the ability of the Contracting 
Party concerned’.209 PECMAS undertakes an evaluation of the documentation 
‘in accordance with the precautionary approach,’ taking account of risks of 
significant adverse impacts upon VMEs before advising whether the proposal 
should be approved and whether particular mitigation measures should be 
adopted.
Given the considerable overlap in membership and the contemporane-
ous formulation of their respective policies, SEAFO has adopted a near-iden-
tical approach to that of NEAFC. In 2009, CM 17/09 on bottom-trawling was 
introduced as an interim conservation measure to address the demands of 
Resolution 61/105, which was subsequently revised and reformulated as CM 
29/14 on bottom fishing activities and VMEs in the SEAFO Convention Area. 
Under this provision, exploratory bottom fishing is defined in a similar man-
ner to that of NEAFC as ‘all commercial bottom fishing activities outside area 
closures and existing bottom fishing areas, or fisheries within existing bottom 
fishing areas when a new fishing method and/or strategies are attempted to 
207   Article 6(5).
208   Article 6(8).
209   Article 7(2).
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be used’.210 As with NEAFC, a NoI is required with materially the same criteria 
and subject to prior scientific assessment, with a view towards identifying the 
current scale of bottom fishing in the Convention Area. This process was com-
pleted in 2011 and, in 2015, a first deep-sea exploratory fishery was initiated by 
Japan for Patagonian toothfish.211
A similar procedure is also envisaged in the context of the NAFO, which 
has also collated this data to identify a series of Seamount, Coral and Sponge 
Protection Zones, within which bottom fishing is prohibited for particular pe-
riods of time.212 Nevertheless, some initial interpretive difficulties were experi-
enced under the auspices of NAFO, whereby an arbitrary allocation of 20% of 
closed seamounts remained open to exploratory fishing, contingent upon the 
fulfilment of these approval processes, until all bottom fishing in these areas 
was prohibited in 2012.213 The NFPC has also adopted a similar approach, hav-
ing established an Exploratory Fishery Protocol for these waters that requires 
the prior approval of separate plans for harvesting, mitigation, catch monitor-
ing and data collection.214
Meanwhile, CCAMLR first expressly considered the problems raised by bot-
tom trawling in 2006, at which point it was determined that any future propos-
als to conduct such activities in high seas locations of the CAMLR Convention 
Area would need to be notified in accordance with its procedure for new 
fisheries.215 At this juncture, CMs 21-01 and 21-02 were revised so that future 
notifications with bottom-trawl gear would be required to provide information 
concerning known and anticipated impacts on VMEs, and specific CMs have 
been adopted to restrict and regulate bottom fishing in the CAMLR Convention 
Area.216 As with the position with CCAMLR exploratory fisheries generally, bot-
tom fishing requirements have been most successfully implemented in the 
Ross Sea, having led to the identification of a series of VMEs in recent years.217
210   Article 2(d).
211   Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee to SEAFO, para 6.9.2.
212   NAFO Conservation and Management Measures, Article 16.
213   See further D Diz, ‘The Seamounts of the Sargasso Sea: Adequately Protected?’ (2016) 31(2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 359–370, at pp. 362–363.
214   CMM 2016-05: Bottom Fisheries and Protection of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the 
Northeast Pacific Ocean and CMM 2016-06: Bottom Fisheries and Protection of Vulnerable 
Marine Ecosystems in the North-western Pacific Ocean; both measures entered into force 
on 16 January 2017.
215   CCAMLR-XXV (n 62), para 12.18.
216   See especially CM 22-06: Bottom Fishing in the Convention Area.
217   CCAMLR-XXXII (n 110), para 5.67.
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SPRFMO has also adopted a broadly similar set of policies, which expressly 
apply ‘in addition to the requirements in any other measures adopted under 
Article 22 of the Convention with respect to new and exploratory fisheries’.218 
Under CMM 4.03, participants are to establish their bottom fishing footprint 
(i.e., ‘a map of the spatial extent and distribution of historical bottom fish-
ing in the Convention Area of all vessels flagged to a particular Member or 
CNCP [Cooperating Non-Contracting Party] over the period 1 January 2002 to 
31 December 2006’)219 and restrict fishing activities to these parameters. In 
2012 a Bottom Fishery Impact Assessment Standard (BFIAS) was introduced, 
under which participants are required to prepare a new bottom fishery impact 
assessment if a substantial change in the fishery has occurred, which would 
render it likely that the risk or impacts of the fishery may have also changed.220 
The BFIAS mandates a description of the proposed fishing activities, a full im-
pact assessment, information on the stocks to be fished and adherence to the 
FAO Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines. This procedure has already engendered a 
promising degree of good practice, with the extensive assessments conducted 
by New Zealand and Australia pledging particular attention to the risk of gear 
loss, additional training for observers and fishers and the development of an 
industry-wide code of practice.221
Buttressing these general policies – and reflective of its proactive regula-
tory ethos – SPRFMO has adopted a more expansive interpretation of bottom 
fishing, which also incorporates mid-water trawling on seamounts, given the 
propensity for some degree of contact with seabed features even at this com-
paratively more elevated depth.222 This position thereby potentially catches a 
wider array of fishing activities within the rules governing exploratory fishing. 
To date, this approach remains a striking exception to more general RFMO prac-
tice, although similar policies were considered by NAFO in 2015, which failed to 
218   This was first established under CMM 2.03 (Management of Bottom Fishing in the SPRFMO 
Convention Area; 2014), para 21; subsequently replaced with CMM 4.03 (Management of 
Bottom Fishing in the SPRFMO Convention Area; 2016). Unlike other RFMOs, the SPRFMO 
requirements apply to all bottom fishing activities, not simply exploratory endeav-
ours: see further R Barnes, ‘The Proposed LOSC Implementation Agreement on Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction and its Impact on International Fisheries Law’ (2016) 31(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 583–619, at pp. 613–614.
219   Para 6.
220   Bottom Fishery Impact Assessment Standard; available online at https://www.sprfmo 
.int/conservation-measures/benthic-impact-assessments/, at p. 5.
221   See further the full series of documentation available online at https://www.sprfmo.int/
conservation-measures/benthic-impact-assessments/.
222   Report of the Second Scientific Committee Meeting, at p. 15.
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find consensus on the issue but instead imposed particular restrictions on the 
design and deployment of mid-water trawl gear.223
The policies adopted by a range of RFMOs to date are eminently suggestive of 
an emerging trend towards the regulation of deep-sea fishing, with particular 
reference to exploratory endeavours. This position is reinforced by the express 
designation by the UNGA of RFMOs224 as the conduit through which deep-
sea fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction is to be regulated, in conjunc-
tion with the technical guidance developed for these particular fisheries by 
the FAO in order to implement the operative paragraphs of Resolution 61/105 
and subsequent instruments. Although the UNGA does not regularly impose 
a political imperative towards a course of regulatory action for specific fish-
ing activities, the isolated examples of previous measures indicate that such 
Resolutions have nevertheless proved to be a compelling stimulus to RFMOs 
and other actors.225
223   Diz (n 213) at pp. 366–367.
224   As Takei observes, the position of actors other than RFMOs is somewhat uncertain in this 
respect, because ‘[n]either UNGA Resolutions nor the FAO Guidelines explicitly articulate 
the potential role of coastal states with regard to deep-sea fisheries on the high seas above 
the continental shelf ’ (n 146) at p. 133. This has resulted in a general degree of reluctance 
towards taking unilateral action, although one intriguing exception remains the position 
of the EU. In this regard, in seeking to implement the pertinent UNGA Resolutions, the 
EU has confined the activities of its Member States in the deep-sea context in areas for 
which no RFMO has been established or interim measures have not yet been agreed for 
the protection of VMEs: see Council Regulation (EC) No 735/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the 
protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse impacts of 
bottom fishing gears [2008] Official Journal L201/8. Under this provision, the use of bot-
tom gear is prohibited in areas ‘where no proper scientific assessment has been carried 
out and made available’: Article 6(1).
225   This is particularly true of restrictions mandated by the UNGA upon the use of large-scale 
pelagic driftnets on the high seas, which rapidly gained a significant degree of regula-
tory traction to the point at which commentators have suggested that these standards 
now represent customary international law: see further GJ Hewison, ‘The Legally Binding 
Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet Fishing’ (1994) 25(4) Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce 557–579. On the elaboration of these provisions see 
DR Rothwell, ‘The General Assembly Ban on Driftnet Fishing’ in D. Shelton (ed) 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 121–145, at pp. 126–131 and R Caddell, 
‘Caught in the Net: Driftnet Fishing Restrictions and the European Court of Justice’ (2010) 
22(2) Journal of Environmental Law 301–314, at pp. 301–304. Nevertheless, the use of the 
UNGA as a more politically charged ‘bully pulpit’ to promote developments in interna-
tional fisheries management – especially in driving adjustments to technical measures – 
has been strongly criticized in other quarters: see WT Burke, M Freeburg and EL Miles, 
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In the present context, particular commitments towards deep-sea fishing 
may be identified, with RFMOs and their participants charged with definitively 
mapping the extent of existing fishing activities, with any proposed expan-
sion deemed to be exploratory in nature. Although the extension of a fishing 
footprint is not inherently precluded, it is subject to prior consent based on 
precautionary scientific review and, as with the CCAMLR approach to new 
and exploratory fisheries, clear requirements as to the collection of specified 
further data. Although exploratory bottom fishing remains comparatively 
limited – both in terms of its physical scope and its emphasis on potential 
impacts upon particular benthic features – this approach provides for the 
concerted acquisition of baseline data to better evaluate appropriate fishing 
locations in a manner somewhat reminiscent of more traditional forms of 
environmental assessment.226 This marked uniformity in approach indicates 
that a number of RFMOs have applied this broad template in order to imple-
ment the commitments articulated within the relevant UNGA instruments, for 
which these requirements may thereby be considered to be representative of a 
recognised set of minimum standards for deep-sea exploratory fishing in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.
 Conclusions
The international regulation of fisheries has long been predicated upon essen-
tially static fishing grounds and their continued ability to provide sufficient 
yields in the face of rising demand and increased participation. However, cur-
rent projections indicate profound impending changes to the distribution of 
many commercially and nutritionally significant stocks and, in turn, the future 
location and composition of catches. The prospective displacement of fish 
and fishing effort towards new stocks, locations, depths and techniques poses 
substantial governance challenges. Previously un(der)-fished stocks and their 
accompanying ecosystems are acutely vulnerable to anthropogenic excesses. 
All too often, new fisheries have been pursued with a cavalier disregard for sci-
entific uncertainty, duly inflicting significant damage upon target stocks and 
‘United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for 
High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management’ (1994) 25(2) Ocean Development and 
International Law 127–186, at p.137.
226   G Sander, ‘International Legal Obligations for Environmental Impact Assessment and 
Strategic Environmental Assessment in the Arctic Ocean’ (2016) 31(1) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 88–119, at pp. 105–106.
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the wider marine environment before meaningful and considered regulation 
can be applied. Despite this rather chequered history, new fisheries conversely 
provide an inviting opportunity – frequently absent from more established 
enterprises – to secure a culture of proactive and ecologically sensitive man-
agement ab initio. The regulation of new and exploratory fisheries thereby 
represents an intriguing test-case for the application of the precautionary ap-
proach to international fisheries management.
New and exploratory fisheries are subject to a hitherto unheralded and un-
explored regulatory framework, which can be seen to have developed in two 
distinct regulatory contexts. Having initially emerged as an issue of niche con-
cern within the Southern Ocean, far-sighted regulatory developments within 
CCAMLR influenced the contemporaneous elaboration of the UNFSA. The re-
sulting provision, Article 6(6), establishes that new and exploratory fisheries 
should be subject to cautious conservation and management measures, which 
are to remain in place pending the acquisition of sufficient data to ascertain 
the prospective environmental impacts of continued fishing, so as to facilitate 
well-informed management decisions concerning the further development 
of a particular fishery. Although Article 6(6) remains somewhat ambiguous, 
its symbolic importance should not be underestimated, having prompted the 
regulation of new and exploratory fisheries to be included to at least some de-
gree within the mandates of all post-UNFSA RFMOs, some of which – notably 
SPRFMO – have subsequently developed comprehensive standards for such 
activities in a relatively truncated timeframe.
Latterly, a similar degree of global influence has been forthcoming in re-
spect of policies to address the protection of VMEs from deep-sea fisheries on 
the high seas, as expressly mandated by the UNGA, with a growing number 
of RFMOs having since established targeted procedures for exploratory fishing 
at advanced depths in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The explicit desig-
nation by the UNGA of RFMOs as the regulatory actors through which such 
commitments are intended to be addressed, and the subsequent striking uni-
formity in the implementation of these commitments, are also compellingly 
suggestive of the formation of recognised international standards for the pur-
suit of these specific fishing activities.
These developments notwithstanding, the maturation of policies towards 
new and exploratory fisheries has thus far only occurred under the auspices of 
CCAMLR. The development of a proactive management framework for new and 
exploratory fisheries within the Southern Ocean has been rightly lauded as a 
significant regulatory achievement, for which CCAMLR has established a series 
of procedures to ensure that such fishing is subject to prior approval based on 
the capacity and previous conduct of the operator, and remains within clearly 
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prescribed limits, with entitlements contingent upon the assiduous collection 
of pertinent data. In principle, these requirements represent a notable prac-
tical application of the precautionary approach, allowing for fisheries to be 
developed in an informed, controlled and responsible manner, with scope for 
adjustments in catch limits, gear usage, data-collection requirements and fish-
ing areas if necessary. This regulatory template has already been successfully 
exported into neighbouring SPRFMO and would represent an effective model 
for consideration by other bodies, including any resultant RFMO for the central 
Arctic Ocean – within which exploratory fishing may be considered likely to 
commence in future years – that may arise from the current ‘Broader Process’.
However, if the regulatory arrangements for new and exploratory fisheries 
under CCMALR are effective in design, complications have been experienced 
in their implementation. There has been a steady blurring of the requirements 
and ethos for new and exploratory fisheries with other forms of research fish-
ing, which may generate future interpretive difficulties within and beyond 
CCAMLR. More significantly, although compliance with CCAMLR measures 
has been generally high, difficulties have arisen in securing sufficient data from 
these activities. This has resulted in an uneven knowledge base between the 
CCAMLR exploratory fisheries, yielding a high concentration of data from par-
ticular endeavours, whereas lesser information has been consistently returned 
from others. Combined with an operational bias towards collecting data that 
is commercially valuable, a number of CCAMLR exploratory fisheries have 
thus operated as de facto commercial fisheries. This position arguably fails to 
meet the central precautionary objective of these activities. Indeed, as particu-
lar CCAMLR Members have themselves warned, ‘exploratory fisheries are just 
that, exploratory, and should not be assumed to be precautionary if they con-
tinue for many years without satisfactory research’.227
Ultimately, new and exploratory fisheries represent a distinct conceptual 
challenge to the precautionary approach itself: such activities primarily occur 
in dynamic marine ecosystems and under hostile research conditions, thus full 
scientific certainty is unlikely ever to be attained – yet the legal framework en-
visages a transition to commercial management upon the receipt of an agreed 
volume of requested information. Critics of the CCAMLR approach to new and 
exploratory fisheries have argued that the present arrangements have neither 
demonstrated sufficient adaptability nor fully addressed reasonable scientific 
uncertainties. Conversely, there is strong endorsement within influential advi-
sory quarters that the requirements of CM 21-02 have been met for particular 
initiatives. If CCAMLR’s Ross Sea Exploratory Fishery is a reliable barometer 
227   CCAMLR-XXIX (n 87), para 12.36.
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of regulatory intent, exploratory fisheries in commercial transition are likely 
to be subject to additional and ongoing research requirements absent from 
fully managed fisheries. This approach may accordingly represent the most 
pragmatic solution to the uneasy compromise inherent in the pursuit of new 
fisheries resources in the face of enduring uncertainty.
